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1 Introduction
Coincidentally, lower search costs on the Internet have been accompanied by a proliferation
of product variants with a rich spectrum of prices. While this implies more choice, it can
also make it more time consuming to sort out the best alternative. In search markets
say for electronics or other consumer goods, each product adds its own incremental time
cost upon consumers, who have to look, touch, twist and turn the products to take in the
relevant features or to read the small print of their contract terms to compare them with
each other. Adding upon this effect, consumers are typically busy and cannot search for a
very long time; at some point they hit their deadline or reach the limits of their patience.
In markets like this, additional variability could thus have the unexpected non competitive
side-effect of decreasing search efficiency.
In this paper we consider these ideas, that date back at least to Ireland (2007) and
are analyzed more recently by Carlin and Ederer (2014). However, neither of these papers
study explicitly the mediating role of intrafirm search frictions and price dispersion as
natural causes of search fatigue in environments with a breathtaking number of variants.
Indeed, due to the difficulty of modeling price competition under dynamic search in stores,
it has not yet received satisfactory treatment in the literature. Problems arise mainly
from complications pertinent to handling the K-dimensional joint price distribution, when
competing firms may carry K product variants in their store, and solving the related fixed
point problem. Moreover, it is not immediate how to set up the model to highlight the
potential effects of variety provision on search.1
To fill this gap in the literature, this paper shows how the existing approaches can
be modified to study these issues. Specifically, we develop a new search model which
features intrafirm frictions and deadlines for consumers2 and focus on an interesting class
of symmetric, collusive equilibria. In these equilibria firms’ profits go up with more variants
because low prices get harder to find.
We consider a model where two firms set prices for K variants and, then, consumers
search costlessly for a while. It is also free to switch. Inside a given store, consumers dis-
cover the available variants one by one in mixed order according to some general counting
process. A consumer’s search strategy thus simply specifies in which store to be at each
time point, given what has been found so far.
Our analysis suggests a natural way for two competing firms to price multiple substitute
products in their store, under optimal consumer search. It is this ingenious pricing strategy
1Standard models of consumer search seem as such incompatible with the observation that consumers
keep shopping for prolonged times in different, individual stores and end finding numerous price quotes
during a single search spell. Namely, in standard models of sequential search rational consumers usually
stop when they discover their first price and in fixed sample models consumers are not able to readjust
their strategies after each price is drawn (Baye et al., 2006). In our model this issue is solved by letting
consumers search costlessly for a while and encounter the available products in a random dynamic manner.
2Either there really is a deadline or consumers just get fed up with search at some random time point.
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which allows firms to make search less efficient although the base line search costs would
otherwise stay the same. Furthermore, in line with accumulated empirical evidence for
oﬄine and online search (Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000); Morgan et al. (2004); Orlov
(2011) and Kaplan and Menzio (2015)), there is price dispersion between similar products
not only across stores but also within stores.
To elaborate, we study a class of what we call obfuscation equilibria to underline the
link to closely related work such as Ellison and Wolitzky (2012). In these obfuscation
equilibria, both firms have K product variants within their stores: K − 1 of them with
the monopoly price, p = 1, and at most one with a discount price, p < 1. It turns out
that this pricing strategy (i) helps each firm to maintain consumers’ interest for a longer
time with a locking effect, and (ii) helps it to price discriminate better across more and
less informed consumers. Consumers have an incentive to keep searching in a given store
until they find that one low price that could be there or until they have sampled through
all the prices. Accordingly, both firms make a higher profit by coordinating to such an
obfuscation equilibrium where each has more variants to engage or exhaust consumers
with.
The key underlying assumptions in our novel search model are that consumers search
under heavy time-pressure (subject to exogenous deadlines) and the variants in a given
store are found one by one, randomly and gradually (according to an exogenous counting
process). This new modeling approach enables us to capture a range of different search
outcomes in a single basic model and vary the degree of exogenous search frictions: the
higher the deadline or the intensity of the counting process, the better the available search
technology. Due to the stochastic finding process, there would always be some informed
consumers and some uninformed consumers just like in the standard workhorse model by
Varian (1980). With more than one variety, however, there would also be some partially
informed consumers, whose search paths then become relevant to track, to see where they
buy from.
One of our main contributions is also to highlight conditions under which an industry
wide increase in alternatives, clearly express in today’s retail sector, could aid firms to
raise their profits or maintain them constant despite lower search costs. To this aim, we
derive a (necessary and sufficient) condition of existence for our equilibrium class, which
hinges on the details of the underlying search technology. It turns out that this condition
is satisfied for any large enough number of variants as long as the tail probability of
discovering extreme numbers of variants converges to zero sufficiently fast and the process
variance is still adequately large.
If this sufficient condition holds, as is the case for example for the weighted Poisson
process with enough variance relative to the mean, we can show that it is possible for
firms to extract full surplus at the limit, where both firms sell infinitely many variants for
the monopoly price. This limiting equilibrium resembles the one in Diamond (1971); with
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just one variant, our model nests that by Varian (1980). Hence, if the sufficient condition
holds for a range of search technologies like with our Poisson process, it is actually possible
for firms to maintain their profits the same despite improving search technology just by
providing additional variants.3
Figuratively, this finding portrays a search market as in a constant battle between
consumers with steadily improving search technology and firms with larger numbers of
redundant variants. More and more monopoly prices are added and spread all over to
dampen consumers’ efforts to find a good price. As the number of variants explodes,
searching for that one discount price becomes much like looking for a needle in a haystack
because almost all prices are then just monopoly prices.
Nevertheless, as a distinction from the well known case of Diamond (1971), where
nobody would have an incentive to search with positive cost and virtually zero gain, in
our deadline based search model the residual price variation is enough to keep all consumers
searching. We also find that our results remain robust to moderate economies of scale: as
long as the sufficient condition still holds, our findings stay the same if we allow for the
possibility that search becomes faster with more variants.
Our results may not map to reality one for one. However, some features do ring a bell
if we think about consumer search nowadays. For example, the number of products offered
by Amazon.com in 2014 is estimated4 to be 253 million (up by 21 million) and, by Ama-
zon.co.uk, Amazon.de, Amazon.fr and Amazon.co.jp respectively, 153 million, 141 million,
119 million and 108 million. These items are categorized into more than 35 departments,
that all include massive numbers of listings which could be considered substitutes. It is
clear from these numbers that, if you wanted to check out all the relevant listings in the
product category that interests you and, say, spend an average of 15 seconds looking at
each, this would keep you browsing at Amazon for a very long time – anyway, longer than
people usually can afford. The same can also be said about Amazon’s main competitor,
eBay, and about many other e-retailers like Walmart, Staples, Alibaba, Target, IKEA,
Fnac etc. or their various local competitors.5
Our paper is related to several bodies of literature. The closest, recent branch or
literature analyzes an individual firm’s or a platform firm’s incentive to increase the search
costs faced by consumers. This work often goes under headings like ”add-on pricing”,
”shrouded attributes”, ”strategic complexity”, ”obfuscation”, ”diversion”, ”confusion”,
”framing”, or ”hiding” (Ellison, 2005; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Carlin, 2009; Wilson,
3We abstract from possible cost because the demand is kept the same and what is thus needed is just
to somehow relabel, reprice and replace the items in the store; there is no need to stock more items. As
a mundane example, a firm’s costs should be about the same if the firm has 100 bottles of ketchup, all of
the same brand, or if it carries 50 bottles of one ketchup brand and 50 bottles of another ketchup brand.
4Cite from 14 August 2014, by Paul Grey from the online software company Export-X.com.
5Such as Verkkokauppa.com, a Finnish consumer electronics retailer who boasts to have lower prices
every day and 55 000 products available (Cite from 25 August 2015, on the ad line appearing with the
related Google Search results).
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2010; Hagiu and Jullien, 2011; Carlin and Manso, 2011; Spiegler, 2014; Wenzel, 2014).
With rational consumers these practices can help to relax price competition by aggravating
the consumers’ holdup problem (Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012), or help in targeting the
right consumer group and in price discriminating between different consumers (Petrikaite,
2015; Taylor, 2015; Gamp, 2015).6 In behavioral approaches, firms try to take advantage
of various forms of consumer bias (Spiegler, 2006; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; Piccione and
Spiegler, 2012; Chioveanu and Zhou, 2013).7,8
Ireland (2007) considers a market with a search engine and allows firms to quote
multiple prices for the same good. Consumers get a sample of prices, one or two each, but
cannot see if they come from a single seller or from different, competing sellers. Therefore,
to profit from this consumer confusion, every firm sends out two perfectly correlated
duplicate prices to the search engine.
Carlin and Ederer (2014) develop a dynamic model of search fatigue. Search costs
depend on how many products were sampled last period. They find that one equilibrium
is characterized by cycles where, every second period, firms flood consumers with numerous
cheap products to tire them out. The next period, these tired consumers go to a random
firm paying the monopoly price.
Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) extend the sequential price search model by Stahl (1989)
to allow for the idea that search costs are composed of both an exogenous part (time to
open a website) and an endogenous part (time to find the price in there). They assume
that search cost is convex in search time: the more you search, the more costly is the next
search. This gives firms an incentive to obfuscate. They show that, if obfuscation does not
cost, a decrease in exogenous search costs is totally offset by an increase in endogenous
search costs.
Similar ideas feature also in this paper. We consider extreme convexity of search cost
in search time: before the deadline, search cost equals zero but, after the deadline, it is
infinite. We also find that the adverse effects to profits by an improvement in exogenous
search technology can be undone by an increase in variants. The key difference is however
that instead of directly adjusting consumers’ search time and search cost we let the firms
manipulate them indirectly, through their pricing strategy and the number of product
variants.9
In an independent study, Menzio and Trachter (2015) construct an elegant price search
6These actions taken by firms, making it harder for consumers to access product information, could be
taken as opposite to advertizing, where firms are providing information.
7Our model can be regarded as rational or behavioral depending how one views the idea that consumers
have a deadline and use it as a heuristic to ration their search time; they search dynamically rationally
during their finite time horizon.
8Some models like Ayres and Nalebuff (2003) also consider add-on pricing as a behavioral phenomenon
from the part of sellers, who fail to acknowledge the full value of long term commitment in building a
reputation of having low prices.
9As an important modeling difference, Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) look at consumers’ stopping rule.
We make stopping decisions trivial and look at consumers’ switching rule.
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Figure 1: A simplified, hypothetical illustration of the eye fixation patterns for a consumer
searching on a retailer website. To quantify the time cost of search, each red dot (fixation)
and red line (transition between fixations) could be associated with a duration to measure
(in microseconds) the time it took to take in and process product and price information.
model with price dispersion within stores. In contrast to our model, where buyers differ
only ex post, their buyers differ ex ante: in their ability to shop in different stores and at
different times. Also they find that price dispersion helps firms to discriminate between
different buyers. Otherwise, their setup is different and they do not consider the locking
in effect that variety has during a single search spell. In their paper, a pre-requisite for
intrafirm price dispersion is a particular correlation structure: buyers who can shop at
uncomfortable times should also be more likely to shop far away.
Petrikaite (2015) has another noteworthy setting with explicit search frictions and price
variation in-store; most other search models treat a firm as a black box. She considers a
monopoly with several differentiated variants, which can be placed and priced individually.
For instance, the most expensive ones can be placed at the entrance and the cheaper to
more remote shelves. Indeed, she finds that the firm has an incentive to raise search
costs of some variants to control the order in which consumers find them and to reveal it
information about consumers’ earlier match values. That also enables the firm to cash on
the search externalizes that greater variety offers to consumers.10
10The classic paper closest to ours is Salop (1977), which considers a monopolist who offers many prices
to tax the consumers with higher search costs. In another classic paper, Wolinsky (1987) observes that a
store can price discriminate by offering brand label products side by side with unlabeled ones. For our case,
price variation works in particular through consumer lock-in. McAfee (1995), Shelegia (2012), and Rhodes
(2014) consider optimal pricing of a bundle of products in a store. In their seminal article, Klemperer and
Padilla (1997) show that stores can also have an incentive to provide excess variety if consumers appreciate
more choice but like to patronize same providers. Our results work through different channels but, in a
broad sense, generalize this inventory expansion incentive to homogenous commodities. The motive to
expand inventory is present also in the ”newsboy problem” (Mahajan and Van Ryzin, 2001).
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This paper is structured followingly. The model is set up in Section 2 where we also
lay out the optimality conditions. In Section 3 we consider different benchmark equilibria,
those with just one product variant and those without intrafirm price dispersion. Our
main findings and examples of obfuscation equilibria are presented in Section 4. Section
5 offers some closing remarks. Most proofs appear in Appendix.
2 Model
We construct a new deadline based search model to study duopolistic price competition
with intrafirm search frictions. Both firms have several product variants with individual
prices available in their store. Consumers find them gradually over time by searching in
one of the stores at a time; they are busy and have to stop by a deadline. To fix ideas
we could view this as a model of online search (see the illustration in Figure 1) with
two competing retailers.11 In this setup each of the available product variants adds its
own incremental time cost on searching consumers, who have to take a good look at each
product to see if it passes the initial relevance screening and check its price. The deadline
could either be fixed or random: we could either think that a consumer has a finite time
budget or that she will inevitably get fed up with searching, at some point when she is hit
by a stochastic preference shock. As a simplification, we postulate that consumers regard
all the variants as perfect substitutes.12
11To give an idea about the kinds of intrafirm frictions there might be, see for example Pinna and Seiler
(2015) and Reutskaja et al. (2011). Pinna and Seiler (2015) estimated from consumers’ walk path data
that an additional minute of search in a grocery store lowers the category wise expenditures by $ 2.1.
This suggest the presence of intrafirm frictions and price variation across substitutes. Often there are
many alternatives in the consideration set. Auchan in France offers, for instance, just ordinary milk, “lait
demi-e´cre´me´ ste´rilise´ UHT, 1 l”, at least, under names “GrandLait”,“la Vache au bon lait”, “J′♥ le lait
d’ici”, and its own basic brand; some of them are placed scattered around. Dreze et al. (1995) observe in a
self management experiment that product location had a large impact on sales. Anupindi et al. (1998) find
that consumers often switch brands if their favorite brand is unavailable. Reutskaja et al. (2011) designed
an experimental setup to mimic the experience in a supermarket, where consumers are searching under
heavy time pressure. They recorded the subjects eye fixations as they were sampling through different
alternative snacks, that were presented to them. They found that the subjects were good at optimizing
within the set of products they had time to look but not otherwise; it always took some time to fixate on
an alternative.
12Obviously, this is not to suggest that vertical or horizontal product differences would not matter for
search. Our aim is rather to point out more elementary price based mechanisms, which might arise only as
a side-product of deepening variety provision but affect search, prices, and profit all the same. It is to this
aim that we assume this more abstract simpler approach. Nonetheless, we presume that consumer specific
match values ν ∼ ∆ {0, 1} could be incorporated into the model without changing its essence because
consumers would still have the same incentive to switch the stores after they find a discount price; the only
difference would then be that consumers might prefer to switch back in the end, which might slightly affect
firm profit in different scenarios we consider. Furthermore, there could also naturally be common values
type (quality) differences between variants, which would then show up in that different variants would have
different monopoly prices and costs for firms; this would only amount to a rescaling of prices. In practice
there could obviously also be various superficial product differences, which consumers might not really
care about: sports equipment stores could offer, say, white, blue, green, and purple striped sneakers with
different textured laces etc. These differences might, however, give the firm a pretext to price individually
these variants.
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Game, strategies, and equilibria
There are two firms i ∈ {1, 2}, each with at least two product variants k, n, j ∈ {1, ...,K},
and a unit mass of consumers, each consumer with a unit of time for searching.13 The
number of variants is exogenous and they all look the same to consumers: they do not
really mind which one they buy, they only care about the price. All variants have the
same unit costs for firms, that we normalize to zero. Every consumer demands exactly
one variant, whose value to her is one.
The firms set a price to each variant they provide and consumers are then free to search
for a unit of time, in one firm’s store at a time, making their buying decisions in the end;
we describe the specifics of this in a moment.
We note that, depending on whose perspective is taken, the prices set by firm i can be
indexed either according to their size order (the firm knows this), pikj ≥ pikj+1 , or according
to their finding order (a consumer sees this): pinj is found prior to p
i
nj+1 , where the last
variant that the consumer has found at firm i by time t is indexed by N it .
Payoffs are linear in prices: if a mass B{pk} of consumers purchases from a firm for price
pk, the firm’s payoff is the weighted sum
∑K
k=1B{pk}pk whereas the payoff to a consumer
who purchased a variant for pn equals 1− pn.
The simplest way to think about consumer behavior in this model is to say that all
consumers like searching for a while and they all have the same deadline t = 1 by which
they must stop it: for t ∈ [0, 1], their search costs are zero and, for t /∈ [0, 1], infinite.14
It is costless to switch between firms;15 this seems quite reasonable in a mall with many
stores or for online search. Thus, for any t ∈ [0, 1] a consumer simply decides whether to
search at firm i = 1 or at firm i = 2.16
The timeline is the following:
1. Firms set prices (pik1 , ..., p
i
kK
) for all their K ≥ 2 product variants.17 These prices
remain unobservable to consumers until they find them.18
2. Consumers search optimally for a unit of time. For every point in time t ≤ 1, they
can search either in firm i = 1’s or in firm i = 2’s store.
13For convenience, firms are here male and consumers are female.
14As we suggested, the primitive of the model being the partition B (to be defined), it is also possible
to let the deadline be random.
15They can thus recall any of the products without a further cost.
16While searching under a deadline like this can be regarded as a behavioral assumption, consumers
search rationally during the time they have. Given the flat search cost, we have been advised that our
model could be interpreted not only as a sequential search model but also as a non-sequential search model.
Notice, however, that here consumers’ search choices are sequentially rational. Further, the right order of
search is crucial to sustain our obfuscation equilibria.
17Technically, all products are of the same type but a firm could carry them in multiple replicas, tagging
a different price quote on each.
18The number of product variants K is common knowledge but the prices are the firms’ private infor-
mation until consumers find them.
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3. By the deadline t = 1 consumers make their purchase decisions and payoffs realize.
The set of prices chosen by firm i ∈ {1, 2} is denoted by
P i =
(
pik1 , ..., p
i
kK
) ∈ [0, 1]K ,
and the firm’s (mixed) strategy is given by
F i =
(
F ik1 , ..., F
i
kK
) ∈ ∆ [0, 1]K .
A (pure) strategy for a consumer is given by
σ(ht) ∈ {1, 2} ,
where ht denotes search history, which lists all the prices she has seen by time t,
ht =
(
1; p1n1 , ..., p
1
N1t
; p2n1 , ..., p
2
N2t
)
.
If the consumer has found no price by t, it is assumed without loss that ht = 1.
This is an extensive form game with complete but imperfect information where a
consumer has a dynamic optimization program to solve. We analyze symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibria where both firms use the same pricing strategy, F 1 = F 2, and the
consumer strategy σ is the same for all consumers.19
Intrafirm frictions
As a new modeling approach, it is assumed that a consumer does not find immediately
all the variants available in a given firm’s store, and hence their prices, but rather that
they are found one by one, randomly and gradually. This could mean either that it takes
time to walk and look around the store or click and scroll about the website to detect a
new product variant or that it takes time to process relevant information as illustrated in
Figure 1.
We model these intrafirm search frictions in this paper with a (continuous time) count-
ing process like a (continuous time) Poisson process. The primitive of our model is a
partition of consumers
B := {BN}∞N=0,
19Unless otherwise specified, it is assumed that beliefs are passive: they are the same on the equilibrium
path and off the equilibrium path. This is very standard in consumer search models. Here this does not
have much bite, though. As will be shown all prices
[
p, 1
]
are on the path and since any price p < p beats
all other prices it would not really matter how consumers would search after discovering such a very low
price; they would anyway end buying for it p < p.
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where BN is the mass of consumers who manages to discover a total of N = N
1
1 + N
2
1
variants
∞∑
N=0
BN = 1.
For concreteness, we next describe the details of consumer search for the special case
where B comes from a Poisson process. However, these ideas generalize immediately to
any other counting process.20
For the Poisson case, the probability that a consumer observes an unseen variant within
the next short time interval dt > 0 is fixed and given by θdt.21 We assume that the rate
θ is the same for both firms i and for different variants as long as there is something new
to find in each, i.e. N it < K.
22 Specifically, as a consumer keeps searching in a given
store, the available variants are drawn in random order without replacement each time
the Poisson shock hits, until nothing remains or the consumer switches.
For example, when firm i has two variants, a consumer who starts to search in its store
finds the first variant at rate θ. For probability 1/2 it is the (weakly) higher price, pik1 ,
and for probability 1/2 the (weakly) lower price, pik2 . If the consumer then continues with
firm i, she finds the other variant also at rate θ. If the first price was pik1 , the second one
is now pik2 , or the other way around. Then she is done with this firm. The consumer can
discontinue or recommence this finding process by switching at any point.
To nail it down technically, when a consumer is searching in a given store, she could see
the available variants in any order: all permutations n : kj 7→ nj(kj) (from the size index
to the finding order index) are equally likely.23 One way to think of this is to say that the
available variants are randomly scattered all over the store. As a motivation, note that, if
the firm could have its way, the finding order would be the size order n = id whereas, if
the consumer dictated it, it would be the reverse n = K + 1− id.24 Therefore, because of
this conflict of interest, a random finding order seems like a reasonable prediction.25
It is noteworthy that by the end, independent of how they search, the mass of con-
sumers who has found N = N11 +N
2
1 variants is
26
20A counting process {Nt|t ∈ [0, 1]} is defined by: (i) Nt ≥ 0, (ii) Nt is an integer, and (iii) if s ≤ t, then
Ns ≤ Nt.
21Her probability of discovering more than one price at a time is an event of order (dt)2 or smaller, i.e.,
negligible.
22In the base line model, this rate θ at which buyers learn new price information is independent of
the number of items in stock K. In an extension, we allow for the possibility that search becomes easier
(harder) with a larger number or items in stock and let θ be an increasing (decreasing) function of K.
23A permutation of set {1, ...,K} is a bijection {1, ...,K} → {1, ...,K}.
24Here id denotes the identity function id(k) = k for all k ∈ {1, ...,K}.
25We could think that a firm and its consumers are playing matching pennies in terms of where to place
the cheapest variants and where to seek for them inside the store.
26For a random impatience shock, hitting the consumer at time s ∼ E(η), the same model would
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BN (θ) =
θN
N !
e−θ.
Search only affects where the consumer finds those N variants but not their total
number (unless the consumer stops early).27
This property is very helpful in the analysis, which could otherwise become pro-
hibitively complex. It also enables us to move easily from the Poisson model B(θ) =
{BN (θ)}∞N=0 where BN (θ) = θ
N
N ! e
−θ to a more general model B(θ) = {BN (θ)}∞N=0 with
arbitrary BN adding up to one. Moreover, to discuss the effects of improving search
technology, our formulation allows us to compare different models as follows:
Definition 1 (Ranking search technologies) General setting: Search technology B =
{BN}∞N=0 is faster than search technology B′ = {B′N}∞N=0 if
∞∑
N=N ′
BN >
∞∑
N=N ′
B′N , for all N
′ > 0.
Poisson setting: Search technology B(θ) = {BN (θ)}∞N=0 with θ is faster than search
technology B(θ′) = {BN (θ′)}∞N=0 with θ′ if θ > θ′ because
∞∑
N=N ′
BN (θ) >
∞∑
N=N ′
BN (θ
′), for all N ′ > 0.
We also make the following assumption to deal with ties:
Assumption 1 (i) If consumers are indifferent between searching within either store at
time t = 0, half go to firm i = 1 and half go to firm i = 2. (ii) If consumers are indifferent
between switching or not switching at some time t ∈ (0, 1), they do not switch. (iii) If
consumers are indifferent between searching and not searching at some time t ∈ (0, 1),
they do not search. (iv) If consumers are indifferent between purchasing from either firm
at time t = 1, they buy from the firm where they were searching last time.
otherwise do but we would have to modify these numbers as
BN (θ) = C(η)
∫ ∞
0
(θs)N
N !
e−θsηe−ηsds.
27We can hence think of this game equivalently as the one where the nature draws for every consumer
first the order in which the she discovers the variants available in each firm, n := (n1(k), n2(k))Kk=1 and,
then, the number of variants that she will ultimately find, N = N11 + N
2
1 , and the exact finding times,
t1, ..., tn. (Note that the exact finding times t1, ..., tn do not carry any relevant information in this game;
only their total N and the permutation n representing their finding orders matter.) The probability of
some fixed pair of (n,N) is BN (θ)
(K!)2
. Initially, the consumer obviously does not see n nor N but she makes
inferences about them along the way because they directly affect her search history, ht. Her optimal search
behavior then determines, from which firm she finds those N variants she is to find, i.e., the decomposition
of N into N11 and N
2
1 .
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Optimality conditions
This part analyzes general optimality conditions that have to be met in an equilibrium;
a busy reader can just skim this part for notation. In an equilibrium, it is required
that consumers and firms’ strategies are best responses given beliefs and these beliefs are
consistent with strategies.
To express this clearly for our model, it is useful to define some notation: minAi
denotes the minimum price in set Ai, and FminAi denotes its marginal distribution; Also,
each price set A ⊂ P 1 ∪ P 2 can be partitioned into firm i = 1’s prices, A1 ⊂ P 1, and firm
i = 2’s prices, A2 ⊂ P 2.
For this general part we do not use symmetry: all goes through even for F 1 6= F 2.
Consumer problem
Consumers search optimally. They know the number of variants K and the underlying
search technology B, and they have some expectations about the price distributions F 1
and F 2. In an equilibrium, it is required that these beliefs are correct. As variants are
sampled randomly without replacement, a consumer also updates her beliefs about the
remaining prices each time a new price is found. In which firm’s store a consumer decides
to search at time t ∈ [0, 1] can thereby depend on both the expected prices F := (F 1, F 2)
and on the realized prices P := (P 1, P 2) – through search history ht.
In a Poisson setting, for instance, consumer problem can be represented by the following
Bellman equation
V (ht) := maxiV
i(ht) := maxi
(
θdtEh′t+dt
[
V i(h′t+dt)|ht
]
+ (1− θdt)V (ht+dt)
)
,
where V it is her value of searching in firm i at time t. The terminal condition for this
consumer problem is
V (h1) = 1− ‖−h1‖∞ ,
which simply restates the idea that a consumer buys for the best price she finds by the
deadline t = 1; ‖ht‖∞ gives the element-wise maximum-norm of ht.
By the principle of optimality, the problem has a solution for any F, P, K and B(θ)
as long as the expectations Eh′t+dt
[
V i(h′t+dt)|ht
]
are well-defined in an appropriate mea-
surable space for any history ht (on-path and off-path). Therefore, assuming for the time
being this is so, any F, P, K and B(θ) uniquely partition the unit mass of consumers as
∑
A∈22K
BA(F,P;K) = 1,
where BA gives the mass of consumers ending with prices A.
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Firm problem
To take firm i’s point of view, we can now integrate out the effects of other firm’s prices
P−i to concentrate on the effects of its own prices P i:28
BA(F, P
i) =
∫
BA(F,P)dF
−i(P−i).
With this notation, if the functions F 1 and F 2 are continuous, the profit to firm i can now
be decomposed as
Πi(F, P i;K,B) =
∑
A∈22K
BA(F, P
i;K)
(
1− FminA−i(minAi)
)
minAi,
where it is assumed that minA > 1 and FminA = 0 if A = ∅.29 Consumers BA who found
prices A buy for p = minA. Thus, they purchase from firm i if its lowest price within A
is lower than firm −i’s lowest price within A, i.e., minAi ≤ minA−i.
Therefore, to constitute an equilibrium, for any prices a firm is using P i ∈ supp(F i)
and for any prices the firm could be using P ′i ∈ [0, 1]K ,30 it should hold that the firm’s
profit is not higher in expectation for the latter than for former
Πi(F, P i;K,B) ≥ Πi(F, P ′i;K,B).
Otherwise, the firm has a profitable deviation.
Endogenous shoppers and searchers
Note especially that, instead of the standard exogenous partition, in our case the consumers
are partitioned endogenously into several distinct subsets BA, based on which prices they
find. In Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) the set of consumer consists, respectively, of (i)
informed consumers who have seen all prices (here B2K +B2K+1 + ...) or ”shoppers”, who
have non-positive search costs, and (ii) uninformed consumers who have seen just one
price (here B1) or ”searchers”, who have positive search costs.
Sets BN in the partition B = {BN}∞N=0 correspond with the various degrees of price
information that consumers could have in this model. The key distinction is that in our
deadline based model consumers search costlessly for a while. In contrast to the earlier
28We assume the standard notation: −i = 1 + T (i = 1), where T is simply a truth function.
29If F i are not continuous, we have to specify how ties are broken. If ties are broken in favor of firm i,
Πi(F, P i;K,B) =
∑
A∈22K
BA(F, P
i;K)
(
1− FminA−i(minAi)
)
minAi
+
∑
A∈22K
BA(F, P
i;K)Pr
(
minAi = minA−i
)
minAi. (1)
30Assume f is the density function related to F . Then, the support of probability distribution F is
supp(F ) = cl {p|f(p) > 0}; closure cl denotes the smallest closed set which contains {p|f(p) > 0}.
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setups, there are thus also some partially informed consumers, who have seen more than
one price but less than all prices (B2+B3, ..., B2K−1). In addition, there are some unlucky
consumers who do not manage to find even one price (B0).
We observe that some of the usual properties of equilibrium price distribution never-
theless continue holding, although generally in a weak form:
Lemma 1 1. Assume that consumers search in both stores with non zero probability.
Then, each firm uses a mixed pricing strategy for pikK and randomizes it over the
same support, D := supp(F ikK ) ⊂ [0, 1].
2. Suppose in addition that consumers switch away from store i after finding pikj weakly
more often than after finding pikj′
if j < j′. Then, the support is the interval D =[
p, p
] ⊂ [0, 1], where p ∈ (0, 1) and p = 1.
3. There are no atoms in the interior of D nor at the lower bound of D.
Notation
Now that the general setting is defined, we introduce the following simplifications to be
applied repeatedly throughout this paper: Since most action occurs here for the lowest
prices pikK ∼ F ikK it is convenient to use their own, distinct notation for them: qi := pikK
and Gi := F ikK . Additionally, it will be necessary in the following analysis to distinguish
between monopoly prices, p = 1, and discount prices, p < 1. We denote by a := Pr(q =
1) the point probability for which q is a monopoly price and denote by H := G1−a its
conditional distribution given the event that q is a discount price. Thus, H(p) = Pr(q <
p|q < 1). We also often refer to a firms’ profit Πi(F, P i;K,B) simply by Π, dropping the
superindex and arguments.
3 Benchmarks
The existence of an equilibrium is never an issue with this model. As Benchmark I, we next
go through the case where both firms have one product variant. There exists an equilibrium
(basically similar to Diamond (1971)) where consumers do not search, a continuum of fixed
price equilibria, and an equilibrium (essentially identical to Varian (1980) or Stahl (1989))
where consumers search. As Benchmark II, we then show that these kinds of equilibria
exist also when firms have more than one product variant (then the last equilibrium type
resembles that by Ireland (2007)). However, with many variants there generally exist also
other equilibria, which yield more profit. Analyzing such equilibria in Section 4 is the
main focus of this paper.
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Benchmark I: the stay-home equilibrium and the search equilibrium with
one product variant
Remark 1 (Diamond, 1971; Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989) (i) If each firm has one product
variant, there exists a (symmetric) stay-home equilibrium where all prices equal unity,
q = 1.
(ii) If each firm has one product variant, there exists a continuum of (symmetric)
search equilibria where all prices equal, q ∈
[
B1
1−B0 , 1
)
.31
(iii) If each firm has one product variant, there exists a (symmetric) search equilibrium
where the equilibrium price distribution is given by
G :
[
C
C + S
, 1
]
→ [0, 1], G(q) = 1 + C
S
− Π
S
1
q
.
A firm’s profit is there equal to Π = C = θe
−θ
2 such that Π(1, θ) → 0 as θ → 0 or θ → 0;
the maximal profit Π(1, θ) = 12e is attained at θ = 1.
supp(G) =
[
C
C + S
, 1
]
=
[
θe−θ
1− e−θ , 1
]
→
[0, 1] , as θ →∞{1} , as θ → 0
The existence of the first two equilibria (i) and (ii) hinges solely on Assumption 1 (iii);
any relaxation of this or an introduction of a tiny positive mass of shoppers would eliminate
these equilibria. These fixed price equilibria are sustainable only because consumers stop
their search early. They think that there are no gains from searching more.
For the last more robust equilibrium (iii), note that, if the firms use symmetric pricing
strategies, by Assumption 1 (i) and (ii), searching consumers approach one of the firms in
random. Then, they search in this firm’s store until they find its price and thereafter in
the other firm’s store until they find its price – or until no time is left.32
This entails that, when it is time to stop by the deadline t = 1,
C = C1 :=
B1
2
=
θe−θ
2
consumers have found only price p1 of seller i = 1,
C = C2 :=
B1
2
=
θe−θ
2
31There is no profitable deviation from q up to unity as long as 1−B0
2
q ≥ B1
2
q because raising the price
q will make the consumers continue to the other store so that, instead of selling to half the consumers who
find something, 1−B0
2
, the firm only sells to consumers who solely find its own price, B1
2
.
32With passive beliefs off the path and one price per one store, what matters for search is expected
prices not realized prices. The discovery of the first price does not give any additional information on the
remaining price in the competing store – their strategies are independent in equilibrium.
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consumers have found only price p2 of seller i = 2, and
F := B0 = e
−θ
frustrated consumers have found neither price. The residual
S :=
∞∑
N=2
BN = 1− F − 2C
of the consumers has found both of them.
To summarize, consumers are here partitioned into ”captives” 2C = C1 + C2 and
”shoppers” S much like in Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989). As usual there is price compe-
tition only over shoppers not captives. Additionally, there are here also some ”frustrated”
consumers, F , who fail to find any price prior to the deadline. They were absent from both
Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989). Another novelty is that our partition can be parametrized
conveniently by the Poisson process to consider the effects of faster search technology. For
example, it is easy to see that the stronger the frictions (lower θ), the higher the ratio of
captives over shoppers CS and the smaller the number of frustrated consumers F . This
implies that, as in Stahl (1989), it is possible also in this case to span continuously from
Diamond-like monopoly pricing (obtains for extremely high frictions, θ → 0) to Bertrand-
like marginal cost pricing (obtains for extremely low frictions, θ →∞) by varying θ. Still,
firms’ profits are maximal for intermediate levels of search frictions because the number
of captives C is the largest for θ = 1. Overall, this equilibrium is nevertheless essentially
equivalent with those in Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989).
Benchmark II: Equilibria with multiple variants but without intrafirm
price dispersion
We next provide three examples where all product variants in a store have the same uniform
price. Remarks 2, 3, and 4 show that, while the focus of this paper lies on equilibrium
price dispersion within stores and across stores and its effects, it is possible to maintain
also equilibria with multiple variants but (i) no price variation what so ever (Remark 2
and Remark 3) and (ii) price variation across stores but not within stores (Remark 4).
Remark 2 (Diamond, 1971) For any K > 1, there exists a stay-home equilibrium,
where all variants in a store have the monopoly price, pik1 = ... = p
i
kK
= 1; consumers do
not search at all.
Again, this is the Diamond (1971) equilibrium essentially: it is the famous impossibility
result, which basically shows the non-existence of an equilibrium with costly sequential
search and endogenous price dispersion in homogenous environments.
The idea behind that result is simple. If additional price information is costly and
15
products are identical, then firms have an incentive to exploit the consumer hold-up prob-
lem, that arises when it costs to visit another firm, by raising their price slightly above
their competitor’s price. Now, since all firms have this same incentive, the monopoly
price is the unique equilibrium price irrespective of the number of firms in the market.
Consumers thus refuse to search, because they would gain nothing from it.
Note that the hold-up problem appears here in a weak form only since it is costless to
search before the deadline. Thus, the existence of this type of equilibrium hinges solely
on Assumption 1 (iii). The proof for Remark 1 (i) is valid as such here.
Remark 3 For any K > 1, there exists a continuum of search equilibria, where all
variants in a store have the same fixed discount price, pik1 = ... = p
i
kK
∈
[
B1
1−B0 , 1
)
;
consumers search (at most) once, until they find one firm’s price.
This is the multiproduct counterpart of Remark 1 (ii). The existence relies as before
on Assumption 1 (iii).
Remark 4 (Ireland, 2007) For any K > 1, there exists a search equilibrium, where all
variants in a store have the same random discount price, pik1 = ... = p
i
kK
∼ G (below);
consumers search (at most) twice, until they find both firms’ prices.
Again, the equilibrium price distribution is
G :
[
C
C + S
, 1
]
→ [0, 1], G(q) = 1 + C
S
− Π
S
1
q
,
where a firm’s profit equals Π = C = B12 .
This equilibrium is reminiscent of the standard case with just one variant we presented
as Remark 1 (iii). It also looks like the equilibrium in Ireland (2007), where firms use a
multitude of identical prices, that we discussed in Section 1.
As for Remarks 2 and 3, the existence of the equilibrium can be proved easily by
reference to Assumption 1 (iii): Clearly, no consumer has an incentive to stay to find
another variant in a given store if there are uniform prices within stores. Moreover, no
firm has an incentive to charge different prices for its variants if consumers only search for
one price for one store.
This equilibrium is no more robust than the earlier ones, however. It fails to exist
if we relax Assumption 1 (iii) because the firm has then an incentive to introduce price
variation to compete more fiercely over repeat customers.33
We thus move on to analyze specific equilibria with intrafirm price dispersion. Before
setting off, however, observe first that while randomizing all the prices independently
33Suppose that firm i deviates to two prices pi1 > p
i
2 ∈
[
C
C+S
, 1
]
. We know that equilibrium profit is
2Π = B1p
i
1 +
∞∑
N=2
BN (1−G(pi1))pi1 = B1pi1 +
∞∑
N=2
BN (1−G(pi1))pi1,
whereas the deviation yields the firm strictly more
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might seem like a good idea for the firms, because then consumers would search in every
store until they have found all the product variants, it is an equilibrium only in some
knife edge cases.34 Note also that, while Assumption 1 (iii) has so far had some bite, in
the equilibrium class we study, it is more innocuous; this is so especially for the limiting
cases where most consumers use all their time in their first store and the deadline is
usually binding. We retain this assumption here mainly so that we avoid keeping track of
consumers who loiter in the stores after serious search only because they have time.35
4 Obfuscation equilibrium
In this section we analyze generally an interesting equilibrium class named obfuscation
equilibria (OE).
Definition 2 (Obfuscation equilibrium (OE)) In an obfuscation equilibrium with K
variants (OE(K)):
1. (Search) Consumers start from a random firm and search in that firm’s store either
until they find a price p < 1 or until they have found K prices such that p = 1 for
all; then they switch to the other firm’s store.
2. (Prices) With probability 1− a > 0 a firm has one (discount) price p < 1 and K − 1
(monopoly) prices such that p = 1 for all whereas with probability a < 1 the firm has
K (monopoly) prices such that p = 1 for all.
This combination of prices is particularly advantageous to firms. Specifically, as con-
sumers know that each firm has one discount price with non zero probability, if they first
spot a monopoly price, they have an incentive to keep on searching in their start store
in hope of finding there another price at a discount. This locking effect, that postpones
consumers’ switching away from their start store, lowers a firm’s incentive to undercut the
other firm’s price relative to the usual setup. Competition becomes thus more relaxed.
2Π′ = 1/2B1p
i
1 + 1/2B2(1−G(pi1))pi1 + 1/2B1pi2 + 1/2B2(1−G(pi2))pi2 +
∞∑
N=2
BN (1−G(pi2))pi2,
as
∑∞
N=2BN (1−G(pi2))pi2 >
∑∞
N=2BN (1−G(pi1))pi1.
34For the case K = 2 it for instance requires that B1(1−pi1) = 1/2B3((1−F−i2 (pi2))pi2− (1−F−i2 (pi1))pi1)
for all (pi1, p
i
2) ∈ supp(F ) because, otherwise, the firm has a profitable deviation in its higher price pi1
to unity or to its lower price pi2 (details upon request); the first case looks a bit like a move towards an
obfuscation equilibrium.
35Repeat customers cannot find anything new on the second round because, in obfuscation equilibria,
firms do not want to use multiple discount prices as that would make consumers switch too early. In
addition, due to the linearity of the firm’s problem there is no reason for firms to offer two separate
discount prices.
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Also, the generated price variation within stores helps the firms to price discriminate
better across different consumers, some of whom are better informed about prices than
others. Although consumers are similar ex ante, their search outcomes differ ex post due to
the random arrival of price information. Additional price instruments are thereby useful
to firms who can use their monopoly prices to tax the least informed consumers while
keeping a discount price available as well to compete for the more informed consumers.
We next show that the depicted consumer behavior is indeed a best response to firms
pricing behavior.
Theorem 1 (Optimal search in obfuscation equilibrium) If firms price their variants
as in Definition 2.2, then consumers optimally search as in Definition 2.1.
The proof of this amounts to showing that, if a consumer has found more monopoly
prices in store i than in store −i, but not one discount price, her chances of finding one
discount price are higher if she continues searching in store i rather than switches into
store −i. Her chances of finding two discount prices are, instead, independent of the order
in which she searches, as long as the consumer switches after the first discount price is
observed. This is so because she then anyway has to find a discount price from each store.
The consumer can find either zero, one or two discount prices in total.
The intuition for this result is that, with a fixed number of variants in a store, at most
one with a discount price, consumers become more and more optimistic about remaining
prices for every monopoly price they find. This makes them continue in their chosen store
until they indeed find a discount price or until they have found all there is available in the
store. They revise their beliefs about remaining prices (in some given store) up each time
they find a monopoly price (in that given store).
We next display a necessary and sufficient condition under which the described pricing
behavior is the best reply to the other firm and consumers’ strategies. There the relevant
question is whether a firm would have a profitable deviation to covertly include more than
one discount price. Obviously, this would have different effects on consumers who start
from this firm and on consumers who start from the other one. The condition we next
show requires that the profit loss from captives who start from our firm and the other firm
is larger than the profit gain from shoppers starting from the other one:
∣∣∆Cim∣∣ (1− p) + ∣∣∆C−im ∣∣ (1− p) ≥ ∣∣∆S−id ∣∣ p (2)
where
∣∣∆Cim∣∣ = (Cim(d = 1)− Cim(d = do)) is the reduction in monopoly price paying con-
sumers starting from our firm,
∣∣∆C−im ∣∣ = (C−im (d = 1)− C−im (d = do)) is the decrease in
monopoly price paying consumers starting from the other firm, and
∣∣∆S−id ∣∣ = (S−id (d = do)−
S−id (d = 1)
)
is the increase in the discount price paying shoppers starting from the other
firm when firm i adds d = do more discount prices (e.g., raises the number of discount
prices from d = 1 to d = 2). This (necessary an sufficient) condition for an OE to exist
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ought to hold for all do ∈ {2, ...,K}.36
Here the key point to observe is that finding one of the discount prices becomes easier
if there are more of them available in a given store. Since consumers switch immediately
after they find the first discount price, this implies that consumers who start from our
firm’s store switch faster to the other firm’s store. This clearly does not benefit our firm
in any way. It just reduces the number of captives for this firm and exposes it earlier to
price competition.
Still, offering more discount prices also entails that consumers starting from the other
firm’s store find a discount price faster after switching to our firm’s store. If they have so
far seen only monopoly prices, this again only harms our firm. By Assumption 1, these
consumers would buy from our firm anyway as their last store. However, if the consumers
have already found the other firm’s discount price, it helps to start the competition as
soon as possible.
Condition (2) also captures our finding that the best possible deviation is to change
some monopoly prices into the lowest price p′ = p. A comparison to the case with just
one discount price p = p makes it clear that the firm may not actually lose any consumers
by the deviation: All consumers who start from its store or come there after finding only
monopoly prices still purchase from the firm. The difference is only in that some of them
now pay p′ = p instead of p = 1. The firm also gains some more demand from shoppers who
now discover it discount price p′ = p earlier than before. The deviation is not profitable if
the former negative effect dominates.
Theorem 2 (Optimal prices in obfuscation equilibrium) If (2) holds and consumers
are searching as in Definition 2.1, then firms optimally price as in Definition 2.2.
It is now possible to derive the equilibrium price distribution in closed form using
essentially the same procedure as in the proof for Remark 1 (iii). In calculating it, we just
have to take into account that, instead of just C and S, firm i’s demand is coming from
several different consumer groups:
• Cim demand from (captive-like) consumers who start from store i = 1, 2 and find no
discount price,
• Cid demand from (captive-like) consumers who start from store i = 1, 2 and find a
discount price only from store i,
• Sid demand from (shopper-like) consumers who start from store i = 1, 2 and find a
discount price from both stores i and −i.
It is natural to derive the demand of firm i from these various demand sources by
moving along consumers’ search paths (see Table 1 below). For example, if firm i has K
36It appears that a single-crossing condition does not hold generally so that we cannot simplify (2).
19
monopoly prices, consumers who start from its store are Cim until they switch after finding
those K monopoly prices. Thereafter, the firm loses them by Assumption 1. (Row 1 in
Table 1.) If firm i has K−1 monopoly prices and a discount price, consumers are Cim after
finding a monopoly price and Cid after finding a discount price. They stay that way after
switching until they find also firm −i’s discount price, which turns them into Sid. (Row 2
in Table 1.) If the other firm −i has only monopoly prices, consumers who switch from
there are by Assumption 1 immediately firm i’s captives. They become C−im when they
find firm i’s monopoly price and C−id when they find firm i’s discount price. (Row 3 in
Table 1.) If the other firm −i has also a discount price, consumers who switch from there
become S−id only if they manage to find also firm i’s discount price; before, they are firm
−i’s captives. (Row 1 in Table 1.) As the parentheses are suggesting, these demands of
firm i from different consumers can be read from left to right from Table 1; deriving them
from the primitives K and {BN}∞N=0 in Appendix is a taxing but rather straightforward
combinatorical excercise:
Finds in the start store: Finds in the next one:
Consumer’s start store only p = 1 also p < 1 only p = 1 also p < 1
i with q = 1 Cim - 0 0,
i with q < 1 Cim C
i
d C
i
d S
i
d,
−i with q = 1 0 - C−im C−id ,
−i with q < 1 0 0 0 S−id .
Table 1: The demands of firm i from different consumers.
Proposition 1 If there exists a OE with some fixed K and {BN}∞N=0, then the equi-
librium price distribution can be expressed as
H :
[
p, 1
]→ [0, 1] , H(p) = Pr(q < p|q < 1) = 1 + (C1d + C2d)(
S1d + S
2
d
) − Π− (C1m + C2m)(
S1d + S
2
d
) 1
p
,
p =
(
C1d + C
2
d
)(
C1d + C
2
d + S
1
d + S
2
d
) ,
a = Pr(q = 1) = max

∑∞
N=1BN
(∑min{N,K}
p=1
1
K min
{
N−p
K , 1
}
− T (N > K)
)
∑∞
N=1BN
(∑min{N,K}
p=1
1
K min
{
N−p
K , 1
}) , 0

and the equilibrium profit for firms is given by
Π = C1m + C
1
d + C
2
m + C
2
d >
B1
2
where the numbers of captives and shoppers are shown in Table 3 in the end of Appendix.
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Moreover, if there exists an OE for K1 and K2 where K1 < K2, then Π(K1) < Π(K2).
To sum up, the pricing pattern in an OE is wired so as to (i) alleviate price competition
by locking in searching consumers and (ii) to price discriminate more effectively between
different groups of consumers. Both effects are stronger as the number of variants increases.
This helps to raise the firms’ profits. Benchmark equilibria in Remarks 2 and 4 provide
a natural point of comparison. We elaborate this reasoning more in the context of the
example in Section 4.1.
4.1 Example: OE with K = 2 in Poisson setting
As an illustration, we now show that in a Poisson setting there exists a OE(2), where the
firms may sometimes have two monopoly prices and, at other times, one monopoly price
and one discount price. In the first case, we say that the firm is in the hi-hi regime and, in
the second case, we say the firm is in the hi-lo regime. The size of this discount is random,
q ∼ G and supp(G) = [p, 1].37
A noteworthy consequence of the hi-lo pricing pattern is that, if a consumer first finds
a firm’s monopoly price, she optimally continues with this firm. She is then closer to
finding a discount price in her start store than in the other firm’s store. Instead, if the
consumer first finds a discount price, she obviously switches immediately in an attempt
to find also the competing firm’s discount price.
This makes using monopoly prices rather valuable to a firm. It helps to delay switching.
Indeed, the benefit from this could be so large that the firms have an incentive to sometimes
use two monopoly prices (in hi-hi regime) instead of just always having one monopoly price
and one discount price (in hi-lo regime). As a result, the equilibrium price distribution G
could have an atom a > 0 at the upperbound.
Specifically, denoting by a the probability that a seller is in the hi-hi regime and by
b = 1− a the probability a seller is in the hi-lo regime, the chances that a consumer will
switch the store after finding one price are b/2 < 1/2 whereas the chances that a consumer
will instead switch the store only after finding two prices are 1− b/2 > 1/2. As shown in
Figure 2.a, the expected switching time could thus be significantly delayed compared to
the case of one price for one store. This demonstrates that price variation within stores
acts here as an implicit switching barrier.
After the consumer has switched, the process of finding another, competing discount
price is also postponed. Namely, the probability that a consumer has observed two discount
prices by t can be expressed as
37Note that, even when Poisson OE(2) fails to exist because there is a profitable deviation to two discount
prices, there may exist a more complex variant of an OE, where this would not be a deviation. There
could indeed be three ”regimes” over which firms would mix symmetrically: in hi-hi regime, they would
have two monopoly prices, in hi-lo regime, one monopoly price and one discount price and, in lo-lo regime,
two discount prices. The details appear in the author’s thesis.
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b2
(
1
2
)2 (θt)2
2!
e−(θt) + b2
((
1
2
)2
+ 2
(
1
2
)2) (θt)3
3!
e−(θt) + b2
∞∑
N=4
(θt)N
N !
e−(θt)
compered to 1 − e−(θt) − (θt)e−(θt) for the cases in Remarks 2 and 4 where there is just
one price for one store and no intrafirm price dispersion. This consequence of a locking
effect is illustrated by Figure 2.b.
Furthermore, additional prices enable the firms to price discriminate more effectively
across different consumer groups, some of whom end having more information about prices
than others. The expected prices that are paid by consumers who find one, two, three
or four prices, respectively, are juxtaposed in Figure 3.a. It shows a clearly decreasing
pattern, testifying to the fact that the firms charge different consumers different prices.
From an ex ante perspective, the lowest price the average consumer has discovered up to
time t, −‖−ht‖∞, is decreasing in this cumulative time t ∈ (0, 1). The phenomenon is
visible in Figure 3.b.
Our general finding for this special case is the following:
Proposition 2 In a Poisson setting, there exists a OE with K = 2 and {B(θ)N}∞N=0
such that θ ∈
(
0, −3+
√
105
2
]
, for which the following necessary and sufficient condition for
existence is satisfied:
1
2
B1 +
a
2
B2 ≥ 1− a
2
(
1
2
B2 +
1
2
B3
)
.
The equilibrium price distribution can be expressed similarly as before. The numbers of
captives and shoppers are shown in Table 2. Depending on these numbers there can be an
atom at the upper end or not.
The atom size is
a = Pr(q = 1) = max
{
B2 −B3
B2 + 3B3 + 4
∑∞
N=4BN
, 0
}
,
and the profit is
Π =
12 (B1 +B2) + a12 (B3 +
∑∞
N=4BN ) , for a > 0,
1
2
(
B1 +
3
4B2 +
1
4B3
)
, for a = 0.
Notice in particular that, due to the strengthened price discrimination and the locking
effect, a firm’s profit is larger in here than before in Remark 3 (iii) with just one product
variant or in Remark 4 with a single uniform price in a store (see Figure 4). Observe also
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Expected switching time as a function of θ for K = 1, 2 (left), the likelihood of
having observed two discount prices as a function of t for K = 1, 2 and θ = 3 (right).
(a) (b)
Figure 3: The lowest price the average consumer has found as a function of N = 1, 2, 3, 4
(left), the lowest price the average consumer has found as a function of t (right); θ = 2.
C1m =
1
2
1
2B1
C1d =
1
2
(
1
2B1 +
(
1− (1− a)14
)
B2 +
(
1− (1− a)34
)
B3 + a
∑∞
N=4BN
)
S1d =
1
2
(
(1− a)14B2 + (1− a)34B3 + (1− a)
∑∞
N=4BN
)
C2m =
a
2
1
2B3
C2d =
a
2
(
1
2B3 +
∑∞
N=4BN
)
S2d =
1−a
2
(
1
4B2 +
3
4B3 +
∑∞
N=4BN
)
Table 2: Captives and shoppers for a firm i with a discount price.
that both a > 0 and a = 0 might arise depending on which is larger B2 or B3. If B2 > B3
(holds for θ < 13) consumers starting from our firm are relatively more important than
consumers coming from the other store. Making them search longer (by carrying only
monopoly prices) is thus more important than attracting as fast as possible those who
come from the other store (by offering a discount price). Thus, a > 0. Inverse reasoning
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applies if B3 ≥ B2 (holds for θ ≥ 13). In that case a = 0.
Figure 4: A firm’s profit for K = 1, 2.
4.2 Sufficient condition and limiting equilibria
In this section we present a sufficient condition that guarantees that an OE exists for all
numbers of product variants K that are larger than some cutoff K?. The first part of
this requires that the tail probability of observing extremely large numbers of variants
converges to zero fast enough,
∑∞
N=K+1BN = O(
1
K ). Then also the low price q is a
monopoly price almost surely: a→ 1 as K →∞.38
Intuitively, offering more discount prices is then not very beneficial since there are not
many consumers switching from the other store to poach by a lower price. Additionally,
the variance of the finding process D2[N ] = E[N2]−E[N ] = ∑∞N=0N2BN −∑∞N=0NBN
should not be too small relative to its mean E[N ]; otherwise, it turns out that the firms
may benefit from carrying only discount prices.
When this two-part sufficient condition holds, it is interesting to analyze the limiting
equilibrium OE(K) as K → ∞. We find that firms can then extract full surplus and
divide the market peacefully among themselves. Both conditions hold, for instance, when
B = {BN}∞N=0 is given by an appropriately weighted Poisson process; we discuss this more
in the following section.
Theorem 3 (Sufficient condition) Assume the following conditions both hold:
1.
∑∞
N=K+1BN = O(
1
K ),
2. E[N ]/D2[N ] ≤ 1−B0.
Then, there exist a finite cutoff K? such that an OE(K) exists for all K ≥ K?.
38The Landau big O notation O( 1
K
) puts an upper bound on the convergence rate of the sum∑∞
N=K+1BN by requiring that there exists a fixed number c such that
∣∣∑∞
N=K+1BN
∣∣ ≤ c
K
when K
gets sufficiently large.
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The sufficient condition ascertains for (2) that
∣∣∆Cim∣∣ (1− p)→ 0 as K →∞
slower than
∣∣∆S−id ∣∣ p→ 0 as K →∞
because then
a→ 1 as K →∞
faster than O( 1K ).
So, we analyze here whether a firm’s profits increase when it adds more discount prices.
Recall that above, ∆Cim(1 − p) denotes the change in profits from consumers who start
from our firm and ∆Cimp denotes the change in profits from consumers who start from
the other firm, when that firm has a discount price.
Note generally that, as the number of variants increases, the event of finding one
discount price is of order O( 1K ) and the event of finding two discount prices is an order
O( 1
K2
) event. We find also that
∣∣∆Cim∣∣ ∼ 1K and ∣∣∆S−id ∣∣ ∼ 1K2 . The result then obtains
as we show that
1−p
p ∼ 2K ; the details are in Appendix.39
An additional technical requirement is that the variance of the process should not
be too small relative to its mean for, othwerwise, the firm has a profitable deviation to
stocking only discount prices. Again, this depends in subtle ways on the convergence rates
of
∣∣∆Cim∣∣, ∣∣∆S−id ∣∣, and the price ratio 1−pp . Namely, for a deviation where the firm has
just discount prices, we can show that
K
1− p
p
→ D2[N ] and K
∣∣∆S−id ∣∣
|∆Cim|
→ E[N ]
1−B0 as K →∞.
The second condition in Theorem 3 is thereby necessary to make this kind of deviation
not profitable.
The general message is that, when the number of variants gets very large, it becomes
unattractive to lower prices to poach switching consumers because there are so few of
them. Searching for the first discount price takes all their time for most consumers.
Almost nobody has time to switch.
In effect, when the number of variants explodes, it becomes almost impossible to find
even one discount price. Therefore, the number of captives Cim who only find monopoly
prices converges to 1−B0. As a result, each firm gets an equal share of these consumers
39Recall about orders of convergence that big O denotes an upper bound (f(K) = O(g(K)) if |f(K)| ≤
c |g(K)| for K large), big Ω a lower bound (f(K) = Ω(g(K)) if |f(K)| ≥ c |g(K)| for K large); f ∼ g says
that f(K)
g(K)
→ 1 as K →∞.
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in the symmetric limiting OE:
Corollary 1 (Limiting equilibrium) If there exist a number K? such that OE(K) exists
for all K ≥ K?, then firms extract full surplus in the limit where the number of variants
explodes: Π(K)→ 1−B02 as K →∞.
In other words, if the sufficient condition presented in Theorem 3 holds, firms can
extract full surplus at the limit as the number of variants becomes infinitely large. This
limiting equilibrium resembles the one in Diamond (1971) because both firms have in-
finitely many variants with monopoly prices. Finding the one discount price that could be
there inside a given store, is hence much like looking for a needle in a haystack. Neverthe-
less, as a distinction from this well known case of Diamond (1971), where nobody would
have an incentive to search when the gain is virtually zero, in our model where consumers
tend to use all their time up to the deadline, the residual price variation is sufficient to
keep all of them searching.
4.3 Example: OE with K > 2 in Poisson setting
In this section we return to the Poisson setting to analyze more specifically profits in OE
with more than two variants. We observe that the sufficient condition that we just derived
can be fulfilled for this case although some necessary modifications have to be made to
satisfy the second part of the sufficient condition in Theorem 3. When this has been taken
care by considering an appropriately modified, weighted Poisson setting, we observe that
an OE always exists as long as the firms have sufficiently many product variants available.
Definition 3 [Weighted Poisson process] In a weighted Poisson setting, the original
intensity parameter θ is modified randomly by another random variable w, which turns it
into wθ. It is assumed that the mean of w is E[w] = 1 and its variance D2[w] > 0. With
this modification, the probability of discovering N variants becomes BN =
∫ (wθ)N
N ! e
−wθdF
where F is the probability distribution function of w. Here, it is also assumed that∫
(wθ)Ne−wθdF <∞ and D2[w]θ ≥ ∫ e−wθ
1−e−wθ dF .
We have chosen this weighted Poisson setting mainly because it features E[N ] = θ 6=
D2[N ] = θ + θ2D2[w] instead of E[N ] = D2[N ] = θ in the standard Poisson setting. This
allows us to illustrate our convergence results without changing the parameter family from
which our examples come in this paper. Furthermore, the weighted Poisson setting is a
natural choice to model a random finding process if search conditions change in a stochastic
manner due to say broadband capacity, unexpected weather conditions, congestion etc.
Remark 5 If {BN}∞N=0 is given by the weighted Poisson process with BN (wθ) =
wθN
N ! e
−wθ, then (i)
∑∞
N=K+1BN (wθ) = O(
1
K!) as long as
∫
(wθ)Ne−wθdF < ∞ for all N
and (ii) E[N ]/D2[N ] ≤ 1−B0 as long as D2[w]θ ≥
∫
e−wθ
1−e−wθ dF . For example, D
2[w] = 1
is enough for all θ ≥ 1.
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In words, there is a weighted Poisson process satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3.
Corollary 2 In a weighted Poisson setting, for any θ there is a finite cutoff K? such
that OE(K) exists for all K ≥ K?. For any K2 ≥ K1 ≥ K?, we have Π(K2) ≥ Π(K1).
This is very convenient for firms in the sense that it enables them to cover any profit
loss from improving search technology by carrying sufficiently many additional variants:
Corollary 3 Consider a change from a slower search technology
{
BN (wθ
1)
}∞
N=0
to a
faster search technology
{
BN (wθ
2)
}∞
N=0
where θ2−θ1 > 0. Then, for any original number
of variants K1 there exists a modified number of variants K2 such that Π(θ2,K2) ≥
Π(θ1,K1) where K2 −K1 > 0.
Discussion and extensions
It is good to remember that K is kept fixed in this paper. We are analyzing the possible,
negative side-effects that a larger number of variants may have on consumers if they are
busy and information arrives gradually within stores. We do not try to account for product
expansion; we take it for granted.
In our symmetric model with fixed K, it is still clear that if firms could they would
have an incentive to coordinate to OE(K)’s with a larger number of variants, rather than
smaller. Profit goes up with additional variants. However, generally, we do not know how
the firms would price if they could also carry asymmetric numbers of product variants,
say K1 for firm i = 1 and K2 for firm i = 2. Theorem 1 suggests that they might not
find it optimal to copy as such the equilibrium pricing strategies of OE(K1) and OE(K2),
respectively, because then consumers would always start from the firm with a lower number
of variants. Nevertheless, we think that the firm with more variants could not be made
worse off than the firm with less variants in an equilibrium that features shoppers because
that would give it a profitable deviation by a lower price; it is thus not consistent for
consumers to expect it to have higher prices and start from the other firm. It should
therefore indeed be beneficial for a firm to hold a larger number of variants.
Recall also that there exist a multiplicity of possible equilibrium outcomes for this
game. Technically, any deviation from the symmetric case could thus be prevented by
postulating that a deviation from the same number of variants leads to equilibria in Re-
marks 2 or 4 with no intrafirm price dispersion. They arise also with asymmetric K1 and
K2 and feature lower profits.
We hence leave the analysis of an asymmetric, endogenous number of variants for fu-
ture. A realistic extension along these lines should perhaps feature product differentiation.
If consumer utility from a product variant would be µ = 1 or µ = 0 where µ would be
consumer specific match value, firms would have an incentive to carry additional variants
for efficiency reasons as well.
We end our analysis by studying one more interesting case. It is conceivable that search
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could become either easier of more difficult with additional product variants. To capture
this idea in the Poisson setting, it is without loss of generality to suppose that an increase
in the number of variants K modifies the base line search frictions θ by a multiplier σ(K)
such that θ(K) = σ(K)θ. Generally this multiplier σ(K) could be either above one (for
positive economies of scale) or below one (for negative economies of scale). To facilitate
the exposition, we normalize σ(1) = 1 and introduce the following definition:
Definition 4 (i) There are positive economies of scale in search if σ(K+1) ≥ σ(K) ≥ 1
for all K ∈ N and σ(K + 1) > σ(K) for some K ∈ N). (i) There are negative economies
of scale in search if σ(K + 1) ≤ σ(K) ≤ 1 for all K ∈ N and σ(K + 1) < σ(K) for some
K ∈ N).
It turns out that our analysis applies almost as such to this extended setting; the tail
probabilities just have to converge fast enough despite possible scale effects:
Corollary 4 In a weighted Poisson setting, for any θ(K) there is a number K? such
that OE(K) exists for all K ≥ K? as long as ∑∞N=K+1BN (wθ(N)) → 0 at least at rate
O( 1K ).
In consequence, as long as the economies of scale in search are not too large, an OE(K)
exists for any large enough K and firms’ profits increase with more variants.
Note that it is not immediate from the outset whether search should have positive or
negative economies of scale: it can become easier to find an individual product variant,
when there are more of them, but consumers can also get overwhelmed by the larger
number. A small number of product variants can also be displayed in a compact manner
but a larger number maybe spread around a wider space.
Still, the range for σ(2) that we find the most reasonable is [1, 2]: the one that lies
between no economies of scale and moderate positive economies of scale. To narrow down
to this range, suppose for a moment that we can associate each variant with a rate φ, for
which it is found on a page or in a room (representing a store). Since this rate is specific
to this given variant it is clearly independent of the other variants’ rates. As a result, (i) if
we model a store with two variants as one page or one room with two variants on it, then
the first is found at rate 2φ and the second at rate φ, but, (ii) if we model a store with
two variants as two pages or two rooms with one variant in each, then both are found at
rate φ.
Thus, it is reasonable to think that the average finding rate per variant should be
within φ and 2φ for two variants (within φ and Kφ for K variants). At extreme, we could
of course maintain a constant finding rate θ for a larger number of product variants K by
replacing the old store, with say just one variant inside the store, by multiple replicas of
the old store, each of them with exactly one variant in it.40,41
40Note that this idea is a modification of the standard replica argument for constant returns to scale.
41We consider here only constant finding rates σ(K) for all the variants in a given store because it is
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5 Closing remarks
We provide a novel search model to analyze how a larger number of variants affects price
competition. Our setup has explicit intrafirm frictions that originate from the gradual
arrival of price information inside the stores and the existence of deadlines for consumers.
These frictions make a firm’s problem of pricing its numerous variants a non-trivial one.
Our paper contributes to literature that analyzes retailer strategies to lock-in con-
sumers (e.g., Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) for price obfuscation and Klemperer (1987) for
switching costs) and to literature trying to explain price dispersion among identical goods
(e.g., Baye et al. (2006), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Butters (1977)). Yet, while the
latter strand of literature has concentrated on price dispersion across stores we find it also
within stores.
We demonstrate that firms have an incentive carry several similar products and gen-
erate price dispersion in their store to amplify the existing search frictions and create
implicit barriers to switching. Price dispersion keeps consumers searching longer in their
first store, leaving them less time for the other competing store. It also helps firms to
price discriminate more effectively. As the number of variants increases, firms can extract
full surplus.
The general problem on the part of the consumers is that they cannot simply commit
to shop around in random and play the stores against one another but, instead, tend to
grow a stronger and stronger preference for their first store as time goes on. For this
to work, it is important that it is focal in the economy that usually firms indeed offer a
discount price. That might give one explanation to why firms often picture themselves as
having discount prices everyday.
We note that, as the firms tag similar items with different prices, they implicitly also
commit to improving their best price to a consumer as time goes on. This resembles a
bit the effect of hiring sales people to reduce the prices little by little and play time so
as to lock in busy consumers. However, when all product variants have their own fixed
prices, this can be implemented in an entirely passive way on the part of the firm. No
sales people are needed in the bargaining, and the commitment issues as for when to give
the promised discount – now, later or never – can be totally avoided. It is the consumer
who does all the work. This idea shows up in Figure 3.b.
As a follow-up project, it would be interesting to consider a model where increased
not obvious whether the first ones that a consumer observes should be faster or slower to find than the
last ones: One could think that a store is composed of different locations, rooms, pages, shelves, floors
or department where each could have a product variant in it. Some of these locations could be easier or
harder to check for a product variant. The first variants could thus be harder to find if a consumer is
checking all the possible locations one by one in a random, sequential and systematic way as there remains
fewer possible locations in the end. It could be the opposite, however. The first variants could be easier
to find in a slightly more strategic way of searching where a consumer starts from the most promising
locations and leaves the least promising or remote ones for the last.
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product variety also has the effect of improving consumers’ match values. Then, the effects
on consumer surplus might clearly be more positive than in this paper. We hypothesize
that there might be a negative price effect and a positive match value effect to variety.
Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We show first that, if consumers search in both firms with non zero probability, there exist no
equilibrium where firms do not use randomized pricing strategies. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose instead that firms apply pure strategies and set a fixed price for each variant. Let us
focus on the lowest price(s) q and the second lowest price(s) r in the market, such that q < r by
assumption. Note that, if only one firm is using q, it has an incentive to increase q almost up to r
to extract more revenue from captives B1. Also, if both firms are using q, both have and incentive
to decrease it slightly to undercut the firm’s price. Thus, every store must indeed have at least
one price that is randomized.
Here are some remarks:
1. Since these prices q are the lowest prices, it does not matter if these suggested price changes
trigger a change in search because consumers who find the lowest prices will anyway return
to buy for them.
2. If consumers search, they search in both firms. Otherwise, if they only searched in one firm
that firm would have an incentive to set its price equal to one. But this would imply that
consumers do not search.
3. The lowest prices q are positive since, as long as consumers are searching, firms can extract
positive revenue form captives B1; marginal cost pricing where prices equal zero is not an
equilibrium here.
Note that a consumer might respond to a given price by switching away the firm for good
depending on the beliefs she holds about the joint price distribution. To organize our thoughts
when this ”punishing” switching response is unspecified, we introduce the notion of competing
prices: price qi (of some fixed variant) competes with price q−i (of some fixed variant) if some
mass of consumers who has found these variants sometimes purchases for qi and, at other times,
for q−i. With just two firms the lowest prices are always competing prices. We next derive some
elementary properties of those lowest prices.
First, consider the support of a firm’s lowest prices supp(Gi) and the support of the other
firm’s lowest prices supp(G−i). Note particularly that, if these supports would not ovelap, i.e.
if ∃S(q, r) = (q − r, q + r) for (q, r) ∈ [0, 1] × (0,∞) : S(q, r) ∪ supp(Gi) = S(q, r) and S(q, r) ∪
supp(G−i) = ∅, then the firm would have a profitable deviation to adjust the pricing strategy such
that all the probability mass in the gap S(q, r) is put on the upper bound of the gap p = q + r.
This implies that supp(Gi) ⊂ supp(G−i) and supp(Gi) ⊂ supp(G−i) such that the supports of the
lowest prices are the same and thus denoted by supp(G).
Next assume that the probability that a consumer would switch away from a firm after seeing
a price is continuous in the price. Then it is immediate to show that, if there were an atom a below
the upper bound of this support, i.e., if ∃T (q, r) = [q − r, q + r) for (q, r) ∈ [0, 1]×(0,∞) : T (q, r)∪
supp(G) 6= ∅, then a firm would have a profitable deviation from p ∈ [a, a+ ] to p ∈ (a− , a) for
some tiny  > 0: namely, the probability of having a lower price than the other firm would go up
discontinuously but the selling price would go down only continuously. This shows that it is not
possible to have an atom in the interior nor at the lower bound of supp(G).
Observe also that these results imply that supp(G) is an interval. Furthermore, as long as there
is no countervailing effect through an atom at the upper bound or through a triggered switching
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response, the upper bound of this interval must be equal to unity. Only captives buy for those
prices, and optimally they should thus be raised as high as possible. 
PROOF OF REMARK 1
(i) Since prices equal one consumers have no incentive to search. By Assumption 1 (iii), consumers
stay at home. Firms have thus no incentive to lower their prices because no consumer would
find them anyway. There exist (almost surely) no other kinds of stay-home equilibria because
any tremble in consumers’ beliefs would restore their incentives to search and hence the firms’
incentives to randomize in prices. For (ii) see Footnote 31.
(iii) This equilibrium can be constructed like in V arian (1980) or Stahl (1989) if we replace
the informed consumers by S = 1−B0−B1 and the uninformed consumers by 2C = 2B1 and note
that the sum is less than one, S + 2C = 1−B0 < 1.
Specifically, by Lemma 1 we know that supp(G) =
[
p, p
]
. A firm’s profit is simply Π(p) =
(C+S(1−G(p)))p because captives purchase from it for any price p < 1 but shoppers buy from it
only if its price is lower than the other firm’s price. This can be evaluated at the upperbound p = 1
to pin down the profit: Π = C. The equilibrium price distribution can be obtained by requiring
that price is the same all over supp(G): G can be thus solved from C = (C + S(1−G(p)))p. The
lowerbound can then be derived by solving the equation G(p) = 0.
This symmetric solution is unique if some consumers search two prices. Since the firms have
the same number of variants, consumers first approach the one with a lower expected price or, by
Assumption 1, for the case of ties, pick a firm in random. Asymmetric pricing strategies are thus
impossible. Namely, if one firm had a lower expected price than the other one, it would necessarily
attract more captives. But this would also imply that the firm has actually a higher expected price
because prices always increase with captives. This is a contradiction.42
Deriving the limits is a straightforward calculus exercise. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Step 1 Formulating the problem clearly
We introduce the following notations to help the exposition:
uA := 1− E
[
min
{
p1K , p
2
K
} |p1K < 1 ∧ p2K < 1] >
uB := 1− E
[
piK |piK < 1 ∧ i = 1, 2
]
> 0
uA is the expected consumer payoff for finding two discount prices whereas uB is the expected
consumer payoff for finding one discount price by the deadline.
Pt(k) =
{
(θ(1−t))k
k! e
−θ(1−t), for k < K −N1t −N2t ,∑∞
l=k
(θ(1−t))l
l! e
−θ(1−t), for k ≥ K −N1t −N2t ,
is the probability of discovering k additional prices during the time that is remaining and
κ(mi) =
(1− a) 1K
a+ (1− a)K−miK
(3)
is the probability that, after finding mi monopoly prices, the next one is a discount price.
We consider a consumer’s optimal search problem when she has found m1 monopoly prices
from store i = 1 and m2 monopoly prices from store i = 2, where mi ∈ {0, 1, ...,K} for i = 1, 2
42Asymmetric pricing strategies are analyzed more in a companion paper Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2015).
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but not a discount price in either of these. Remember that we assumed that pi1 = ... = p
i
K−1 = 1
(K − 1 monopoly prices) and with probability a ∈ (0, 1) piK = 1 but with probability 1− a ∈ (0, 1)
piK < 1 (at maximum one discount price).
Note that the consumer’s problem is trivial after she finds a discount price because, since a
store has only one discount price by assumption, it is then best for the consumer to switch the
stores and spend the rest of the time in the other store to find also the other discount price. The
consumer’s problem is trivial also when the situation is symmetric, m1 = m2, because we assumed
that, if t = 0 the ties are broken in random and, if t > 0 they are broken in favor of the store where
the consumer is at that very moment. Therefore, we are here only interested in cases where, with
no loss, m1 > m2: consumer has found more monopoly prices from store i = 1 than from store
i = 2.
Next, suppose we knew that the consumer will find k ∈ {1, 2, ...}more prices before the deadline
t = 1. We want to show that, for any (k,m1,m2) with m1 > m2, the consumer is at least weakly
better off by continuing in store i = 1 than by switching to store i = 2. This increases her chances
of finding two discount prices (one discount price), φA (φB), and decreases her chances of not
finding any discount prices, 1− φA − φB .
Her payoff can thus be written as
E[u] = uAφA + uBφB .
We next want to determine φA and φB as functions of consumer strategy for some given tuple
(k,m1,m2). In other words, the consumer has so far drawn a total of m1 + m2 > 2m2 monopoly
prices and has now exactly k > 0 draws left to find also some discount prices. Denote by ρ(p) the
probability that a the first discount price is found at the p’th draw (p ∈ {1, ..., k}), and by ρ′(p) the
probability that another discount price is found thereafter at some p′’th draw (p′ ∈ {p+ 1, ..., k}).
With this notation, it is now possible to express φA and 1− φA − φB as
φA = ρ(1)ρ
′(1) + ρ(2)ρ′(2)(1− ρ(1)) + ...+ ρ(k)ρ′(k)(1− ρ(1)) · · · (1− ρ(k − 1))
=
k∑
i=1
ρ(i)ρ′(i)
i−1∏
j=1
(1− ρ(j)) (4)
1− φA − φB = (1− ρ(1)) + (1− ρ(2)) + ...+ (1− ρ(k))
=
k∑
i=1
(1− ρ(i)). (5)
It is thus clear that the vectors ρ = (ρ(1), ..., ρ(k)) and ρ′ = (ρ′(1), ..., ρ′(k)) uniquely deter-
mine consumer payoffs. Note that both ρ and ρ′ depend on consumer strategy and preset values
(k,m1,m2). We next consider how the vectors ρ and ρ′ can be constructed of the κ’s we defined
earlier. There are certain crucial restrictions on this process because m1 (m2) obviously increases
by one each time the consumer finds a monopoly price from store i = 1 (i = 2); it is necessary to
make sure that we keep track of these dynamics.
This constraint, which is essentially a feasibility requirement, can be most conveniently sat-
isfied by requiring that vector ρ has subvectors ρ1 := (κ(m1), ..., κ(m1 + k1 − 1)) and ρ2 :=
(κ(m2), ..., κ(m2 + k2 − 1)) where k1 + k2 = k. A subvector is obtained from a vector by omitting
certain elements but not changing their order. Another way to put this is saying that the index
set I = {1, ..., k} can be partitioned into two disjoint sets, I1 ∪ I2 = I and I1 ∩ I2 = ∅, such that
(ρ(i))i∈I = ρ, (ρ(i))i∈I1 = ρ
1, and (ρ(i))i∈I2 = ρ
2.
The process is easiest to understand by thinking that vector ρ is constructed by stacking it up
element for element from the beginning to the end, choosing for every element either the earliest
unselected element of κ1 or that of κ2,
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κ1 = (κ(m1), ..., κ(K))
κ2 = (κ(m2), ...,κ(m1), ..., κ(K))
Note that κ1 and κ2 are increasing in the sense that κ(m) < κ(m+1) for allm ∈ {m2, ...,K − 1}
as can be seen from (3). Also, κ1 can be obtained as a subvector of κ2 by omitting the first and
therefore the lowest m1 −m2 elements of κ2.
Step 2 Showing that the probability of finding one more discount price is larger with this search
order
It is hence clear that (5) is minimized by selecting
ρ =

(κ(m1), ..., κ(m1 + k1 − 1)), for k ≤ m1 −K and k1 = k
(κ(m1), ..., κ(m1 + k1 − 1), κ(m2), ..., κ(m2 + k2 − 1)), for m1 −K < k,
and k1 = K −m1,
and k2 = k − k1,
where it is assumed without loss that k ≤ m1 +m1 − 2K.
Step 3 Showing that the probability of finding two more discount prices does not depend on search
order
We next want to show that the exact same choice is also a maximizer of (4). To do so note
that each ρ with subvectors ρ1 and ρ2 induces a specific ρ′. To see this, take any ρ(i) and define
the numbers n1(i) and n2(i) as follows
n1(i) := #
{
j ∈ I1|j ≤ i} ,
n2(i) := #
{
j ∈ I2|j ≤ i} .
Then we have for the case of i ∈ I1
ρ′(i) =

(1−a)K−(m2+n2(i))K
a+(1−a)K−(m2+n2(i))K
=∑m2+n2(i)+k−i
s=m2+n2(i) κ(s)
∏s−1
t=m2+n2(i)(1− κ(t)), if k − i < K − (m2 + n2(i)) > 0,
(1−a) k−iK
a+(1−a)K−(m2+n2(i))K
=∑K
s=m2+n2(i) κ(s)
∏s−1
t=m2+n2(i)(1− κ(t)), if k − i ≥ K − (m2 + n2(i)) > 0,
0, if K − (m2 + n2(i)) ≤ 0.
The case with i ∈ I2 is symmetric.
It is thus rather easy to see that (4) is independent of consumer strategy, the exact choice of
ρ. Due to any change in consumer strategy, what is gained in the probability of finding the first
discount price is lost in the probability of finding the second one. Hence the search order makes
no difference because the consumer should anyway search in both of these stores until a discount
price is found. Thus, the minimizer of (5) is a maximizer of (4). 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Step 1 Deriving Π on-path and off-path
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We first derive the profit to a firm who has d discount prices q < 1 and K− d monopoly prices
p = 1. We assume the other firm has K monopoly prices and no discount price, with probability
a, and K − 1 monopoly prices and one discount price, with probability 1 − a. Without loss of
generality, let the former firm be firm i = 1 and let the latter one be i = 2.
Now consider a consumer who has found N prices, or all of them for N > 2K. It is convenient
to divide demand of firm i = 1 from the consumers into six possible consumer segments:
• Cim(N) demand from (captive-like) consumers who start from store i = 1, 2 and find no
discount price,
• Cid(N) demand from (captive-like) consumers who start from store i = 1, 2 and find a
discount price only from store i,
• Sid(N) demand from (shopper-like) consumers who start from store i = 1, 2 and find a
discount price from both stores i and −i.
For concreteness, we assume the perspective of firm i = 1 next; this is clearly without loss.
The profit to firm i = 1 from consumers who discover N prices can now be expressed as
Π1(N) = C1m(N) + C
2
m(N) +
(
C1d(N) + C
2
d(N)
)
q +
(
S1d(N) + S
2
d(N)
)
(1−H(q))q.
Firm i = 1’s full profit is hence given by the following sum
Π1 =
∞∑
N=1
BNΠ
1(N).
If we write the above expressions of Cim, C
i
d and S
i
d such that d is kept a free variable, they
immediately lend themselves for both on-path (d = 0 or d = 1) and off-path analysis (d > 1).
The demands from the defined consumer segments can now be written as
2C1m(N) = T (N ≤ K)
(
K−d
N
)(
K
N
)
2C1d(N) =
min{N,K}∑
p=1
(
K−d
p−1
)(
K
p−1
) d
K − p+ 1
(
a+ (1− a)T (N − p ≤ K)
(
K−1
N−p
)(
K
N−p
))
2S1d(N) =
min{N,K}∑
p=1
(
K−d
p−1
)(
K
p−1
) d
K − p+ 1
(
1− a− (1− a)T (N − p ≤ K)
(
K−1
N−p
)(
K
N−p
))
2C2m(N) = aT (N −K ≤ K)
(
K−d
N−K
)(
K
N−K
)
2C2d(N) = a
(
1− T (N −K ≤ K)
(
K−d
N−K
)(
K
N−K
))
2S2d(N) = (1− a)
min{N,K}∑
p=1
(
K−1
p−1
)(
K
p−1
) 1
K − p+ 1
(
1− T (N − p ≤ K)
(
K−d
N−p
)(
K
N−p
))T (d > 0). (6)
Let us now briefly explain how these are obtained. First, the number two in front of each is there
because half the consumers start from firm i = 1 and half of them start from firm i = 2. This implies
that, for example, C1m + C
1
d + S
1
d =
1−B0
2 because these are those consumers who start from firm
i = 1 and then change from C1m to C
1
d as they find the discount price from firm i = 1 and then from
C1d to S
1
d as they find the discount price from firm i = 2. Of course, not all have time to go through
those changes. Thus, we want to calculate how many end up being C1m, C
1
d and S
1
d respectively.
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This depends when they would find each discount price and how many prices they manage to find
in total. Consumers C1m(N) start from firm i = 1 and find only its monopoly prices. If a consumer
finds a total of N prices, which takes place with probability BN , the likelihood that none of these
is a discount price is
(K−dN )
(KN)
where N ≤ K. Consumers C1m(N) start from firm i = 1 and find only
its discount price. In other words, we require that she does discover a discount price from store
i = 1 but that she does not find a discount price from store i = 2. Since these events are interlinked
because the consumer switches only after she finds the first discount price, we also have to take into
account different possible timings as for her observing the first discount price in deriving for instance
C1d and S
1
d . We hence write C
1
d(N) as
∑min{N,K}
p=1
(K−dp−1 )
( Kp−1)
d
K−p+1
(
a+ (1− a)T (N − p ≤ K) (
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
)
,
where we sum over all possible finding times p and
(K−dp−1 )
( Kp−1)
. The likelihood that consumer does not
find a discount price before she finds variant p, is
(K−dp−1 )
( Kp−1)
, the probability that she then finds it
is dK−p+1 and the probability that she does not find another discount price after switching is
a + (1 − a)T (N − p ≤ K) (
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
. In deriving S1d from C
1
d we can simply change the probability
a+(1−a)T (N−p ≤ K) (
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
(of not finding q−i after switching) to the complementary probability
1− a− (1− a)T (N − p ≤ K) (
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
(of finding q−i after switching). For C−im and C
−i
d we note that
these events arise only if the other firm does not have a discount price, occurring with probability
a and for S−id that this requires that the other firm does have a discount price, occurring with
probability 1− a.
Since unity is in supp(G) by Lemma 1, profit in OE can be obtained by evaluating it for d = 1
and q = 1−  for → 0+:
Π(K,B|d = 1, q = 1) =
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 1)+C2m(N |d = 1)+C1d(N |d = 1)+C2d(N |d = 1)
)
. (7)
Note that the firm could also raise q = 1−  for → 0+ a little bit such that d = 0 and q = 1.
That would yield a profit:
Π(K,B|d = 0, q = 1) =
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 0)+C2m(N |d = 0)+C1d(N |d = 0)+C2d(N |d = 0)
)
. (8)
In either case the firm attracts only captives because it prices at unity. The probability of
selling to shoppers is negligible. If the firm sets a lower discount priceq < 1, however, its profit
becomes
Π(K,B|d = 0, q < 1) =
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 1) + C2m(N |d = 1) (9)
+
(
C1d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1)
)
q
+
(
S1d(N |d = 1) + S2d(N |d = 1)
)
(1−H(q))q) ..
Step 2 Deriving a and H (i.e., G), and p
We can now use these different ways of writing profits (7), (8), and (9) to derive a and H (i.e.,
G), and p. To support randomized pricing strategies, note that all discount prices q ∈ supp(G)
should give the firm the same profit. In particular, if it is the case that (8) exceeds (7) for a = 0,
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then the firm has a profitable deviation to using monopoly prices only unless the other firm also
uses monopoly prices often enough to make it profitable to undercut those higher prices. In that
case, a is defined by setting (7) and (8) equal:
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 1) + C2m(N |d = 1) + C1d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1)
)
=
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 0) + C2m(N |d = 0) + C1d(N |d = 0) + C2d(N |d = 0)
)
.
By inserting the expressions for consumers (6) that we derived earlier and by rearranging we
get
∞∑
N=1
BN (T (N ≤ K) + aT (N > K)) =
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
T (N ≤ K)K −N
K
+ aT (N > K) +
min{N,K}∑
p=1
1
K
(
a+ (1− a)T (N − p ≤ K)K −N + p
K
)⇐⇒
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
T (N ≤ K)N
K
)
=
∞∑
N=1
BN
min{N,K}∑
p=1
1
K
(
a+ (1− a)T (N − p ≤ K)K −N + p
K
)
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
min
{
N
K
, 1
})
=
∞∑
N=1
BN
min{N,K}∑
p=1
1
K
(
a+ (1− a) max
{
K −N + p
K
, 0
})
a =
∑∞
N=1BN
(
min
{
N
K , 1
}−∑min{N,K}p=1 1K +∑min{N,K}p=1 1K −∑min{N,K}p=1 1K max{K−N+pK , 0})∑∞
N=1BN
(∑min{N,K}
p=1
1
K
(
1−max
{
K−N+p
K , 0
}))
a =
∑∞
N=1BN
(∑min{N,K}
p=1
1
K min
{
N−p
K , 1
}
+ min
{
N
K , 1
}−∑min{N,K}p=1 1K)∑∞
N=1BN
(∑min{N,K}
p=1
1
K min
{
N−p
K , 1
})
a =
∑∞
N=1BN
(∑min{N,K}
p=1
1
K min
{
N−p
K , 1
}
− T (N > K)
)
∑∞
N=1BN
(∑min{N,K}
p=1
1
K min
{
N−p
K , 1
}) . (10)
If the denominator is below zero, then a = 0, but if the denominator is above zero, then
a ∈ (0, 1).
Next we can derive the equilibrium price distribution H conditional on assumption that q < 1
as a function of profits Π by requiring that (9) equals (7):
Π =
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 1) + C2m(N |d = 1)
+
(
C1d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1)
)
q
+
(
S1d(N |d = 1) + S2d(N |d = 1)
)
(1−H(q))q) .
which gives
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H(q) = 1 +
∑∞
N=1BN
(
C1d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1)
)∑∞
N=1BN (S
1
d(N |d = 1) + S2d(N |d = 1))
−Π−
∑∞
N=1BN
(
C1m(N |d = 1)− C2m(N |d = 1)
)∑∞
N=1BN (S
1
d(N |d = 1) + S2d(N |d = 1))
1
q
. (11)
The lower bound it then the price for which the probability distribution function vanishes
H(p) = 0 and for which the firm thus attracts all the shoppers
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 1) + C2m(N |d = 1)
+ C1d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1)
)
=
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 1) + C2m(N |d = 1)
+
(
C1d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1)
)
p
+
(
S1d(N |d = 1) + S2d(N |d = 1)
)
p
)
, .
such that
p =
∑∞
N=1BN
(
C1d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1)
)∑∞
N=1BN (C
1
d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1) + S1d(N |d = 1) + S2d(N |d = 1))
. (12)
Step 3 Observing that analyzing only deviations to the lower bound suffices
With an extra discount price the firm’s profit is a linear function of form A1 + A2q + A3h +
A4(1 − H(q))q + A5(1 − H(h))h where (1 − H(q))q and (1 − H(h))h are a linear functions of
form A6 + A7h; this is easy to see by looking at (9) and (11). As a result, the optimal way
to deviate involves choosing the old discount price q and the new discount price h so that they
lie on the boundaries of
[
p, 1
]2
. We can easily show that the firm never gains by deviating to
(h, g) = (1− , 1− ) nor by deviating to (h, g) = (1− , p), where  > 0 is a small number. In both
cases the firm loses a fraction of its captives but never gains in terms of shoppers starting from
the other firm because they almost surely have already found a better price. Therefore, the only
relevant deviation to consider is that to (h, g) = (p, p). Obviously, any deviation to (h, g) ∈ [0, p)2
is dominated by a deviation to (h, g) = (p, p) so that we need not cover those. Essentially the same
analysis applies for a larger number of discount prices.
Step 4 Deriving the necessary and sufficient condition
Thus, firm i = 1 has no profitable deviation from OE as long as
Π(K,B|d = 1, q = p) ≥ Π(K,B|d = 2, q = p).
This boils down to the necessary and sufficient condition
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∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 1) + C2m(N |d = 1)
+
(
C1d(N |d = 1) + C2d(N |d = 1)
)
p
+
(
S1d(N |d = 1) + S2d(N |d = 1)
)
p
) ≥
∞∑
N=1
BN
(
C1m(N |d = 2) + C2m(N |d = 2)
+
(
C1d(N |d = 2) + C2d(N |d = 2)
)
p
+
(
S1d(N |d = 2) + S2d(N |d = 2)
)
p
)
..
Note that C1m + C
1
d + S
1
d =
1−B0
2 for both d = 1 and d = 2 and C
2
m + C
2
d =
a
∑∞
N=K+1 BN
2 for
both d = 1 and d = 2. Since they are thus fixed and both Cid and S
i
d purchase for certain for p,
the loss from this deviation is(
C1m(d = 1)− C1m(d = 2)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|∆C1m|
(
1− p)+ (C2m(d = 1)− C2m(d = 2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:a|∆C2m|
(
1− p) ,
because those numbers of new consumers now buy for p whereas before they used to buy for 1.
The gain of this deviation is (
S2d(d = 2)− S2d(d = 1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:(1−a)|∆S2d|
p,
because that many new consumers, coming from the other firm after finding its discount price,
discover p earlier and buy for that.
The cases where the firm deviates to a larger number of discount prices d > 2 must also be
covered; the conditions are then basically the same: just replace each d = 2 with some d = do. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
This can be obtained directly from the above proof of Theorem 2 by inserting appropriate values
of (6) into the expressions (10), (11), (12), and (7) that were derived for G and Π.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
This is a special example of Proposition 1. The range of values θ under which an OE(K) exists,(
0, −3+
√
105
2
]
=
(
0, 13
) ∪ [ 13 , −3+√1052 ], is obtained by assuming first zero atom size a = 0. With
this we obtain that B3 =
θ3
3! e
−θ > B2 = θ
2
2! e
−θ ⇐⇒ θ ≥ 13 (condition for zero atom size) and
1
2B1 =
1
2
θ1
1! e
−θ ≥ 12
(
1
4B2 +
1
4B3
)
= 12
(
1
4
θ2
2! e
−θ + 14
θ3
3! e
−θ
)
⇐⇒ −θ2 − 3θ + 24 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ θ ∈[
−3−√105
2 ,
−3+√105
2
]
(condition for no profitable deviation). This gives us the first range of values[
1
3 ,
−3+√105
2
]
. We can then turn to the case of positive atom size a > 0. This itself implies that
θ < 13 . We then observe that deviations are less profitable with a > 0 than with a = 1 because
1
2B1 − 12
(
1
4B2 +
1
4B3
)
+ a2
1
2
(
3
4B2 +
1
4B3
)
> 12B1 − 12
(
1
4B2 +
1
4B3
)
. In other words, all θ < 13
will also do; there exist no profitable deviations for any of them because they are all included in[
−3−√105
2 ,
−3+√105
2
]
. This gives us the other range of values
(
0, 13
)
. 
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PROOF OF THEOREM 3
So here we analyze only the first and the third terms of (2). The first term can be written as43
∣∣∆Cim∣∣ (1− p) = ∞∑
N=1
BN

(
K−1
N
)(
K
N
) − (K−2N )(
K
N
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:w(K,N)
 (1− p),
and the third term can be written as
∣∣∆S−id ∣∣ p = (1− a) ∞∑
N=1
BN
N∑
p=1
1
K

(
K−1
N−p
)(
K
N−p
) − (K−2N−p)(
K
N−p
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:w(K,N−p)
 p,
The price ratio can be written as44
1− p
p
=
Sid + S
−i
d
Cid + C
−i
d
=2(1− a)
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
1
K
(
1− (
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
)
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
1
K
(
a+ (1− a) (
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
)
+ a
∑∞
N=K+1BN
2K−N
K
=2(1− a)
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
1
K g(K,N, p)∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
1
K (a+ (1− a)(1− g(K,N, p))) + a
∑∞
N=K+1BN
2K−N
K
,
where we have used a newly defined function g(K,N, p) := 1− (
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
. It is then easy to calculate
that w(K,L) = (K−L)L(K−1)K and simplify g slightly to obtain
w(K,N) =
(K −N)N
(K − 1)K and w(K,N − p) =
(K −N + p)(N − p)
(K − 1)K
g(K,N, p) =
N − p
K
and 1− g(K,N, p) = K −N + p
K
.
We want to show that, for large values of K, the first term of (2) is at least as large as the
third term of (2). This requirement can now be stated as
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
K
Nw(K,N)∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1(1− (1− a)g(K,N, p)) + aK
∑∞
N=K+1BN
2K−N
K
≥
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1 w(K,N − p)
2
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1 g(K,N, p)
.
We have inserted the derived expressions for w and g, canceled out two (1−a)’s and multiplied
43We can from now on ignore T (N ≤ K) and T (N − p ≤ K) because we are doing this only for taking
the limit K →∞; both T ’s will equal one for larger values of K.
44We have here replaced 1− (
K−1
N−K)
( KN−K)
by 2K−N
K
.
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both numerators and denominators by K. Next, to take the limit of this, note that functions w
and g appear both twice in symmetric positions there, after the double summations. These terms
can now be rewritten as
K
N
w(K,N) =
K
N
(K −N)N
(K − 1)K =
1− NK
1− 1K
→ 1, as K →∞,
1− g(K,N, p) = K −N + p
K
= 1− N
K
+
p
K
→ 1, as K →∞,
Kw(K,N − p) = K (K −N + p)(N − p)
(K − 1)K = (N − p)
1− NK + pK
1− 1K
→ N − p, as K →∞,
Kg(K,N, p) = K
N − p
K
= N − p.
This implies that, as long as
∑∞
N=K+1BN = O(
1
K ) such that aK
∑∞
N=K+1BN
2K−N
K → 0 as
K →∞ (we need this convergence) and 1−a = O( 1K ) (any a would be just fine here), taking both
sides of the inequality to the limit gives
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
K
Nw(K,N)∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1(1− (1− a)g(K,N)) + aK
∑∞
N=K+1BN
2K−N
K
→ 1 ≥
1
2
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1 w(K,N − p)∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1 g(K,N, p)
→ 1
2
.
Note that the same analysis applies for deviations to a larger number of discount prices d > 2
because the limits are just the same for those cases. We just replace w(k,N) with w(k,N, d),
where d would then be some larger fixed number:
w(k,N, d) =
(
K−1
N
)(
K
N
) − (K−dN )(
K
N
)
=
K −N
K
1− (K−1−N)!(K−d−N)!
(K−1)!
(K−d)!

=
K −N
K
(
1− (K − 1−N) · · · (K − d−N + 1)
(K − 1) · · · (K − d+ 1)
)
=
K −N
K
(
1− (K − 1−N)K
d−2(1− 2K − NK ) · · · (1− dK − NK + 1K )
(K − 1)Kd−2(1− 2K ) · · · (1− dK + 1K )
)
=
K −N
K
(
1− (K − 1−N)(1−
2
K − NK ) · · · (1− dK − NK + 1K )
(K − 1)(1− 2K ) · · · (1− dK + 1K )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
→ NK−1 as K→∞
.
We also want to make sure that the firm has no profitable deviation to keeping infinite numbers
of discount prices. In particular, if the firm had just discount prices the change in its profit from Cim
would be
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
1
N
K−N
K (1− p) and Sid would be (1− a)
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
1
K
(
K−N+p
K
)
p.
These can be compared in the similar manner as before.45
45Same kind of comparisons can be made for cases where there is a finite number m of monopoly prices
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K1− a
1− p
p
=
2
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1(N − p)∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1(1− (1− a)g(K,N, p)) + aK
∑∞
N=K+1BN
2K−N
K
→ D
2[N ]
1
,
because
2
∞∑
N=1
BN
N∑
p=1
(N − p) = 2
∞∑
N=1
BN (N
2 −N 1 +N
2
)
=2
∞∑
N=1
BN (
N2
2
− N
2
) =
∞∑
N=1
BN (N
2 −N)
=E[N2]− E[N ] = D2[N ],
whereas
K
1− a
∣∣∆S−id ∣∣
|∆Cim|
=
∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1(1− NK + pK )∑∞
N=1BN
∑N
p=1
1
N (1− NK )
→ E[N ]
1−B0 .
So, particularly, this implies that Poisson distribution does not satisfy these requirements as
such because for that case E[N ] = D2[N ] = θ. However, a weighted Poisson variable N ∼ P (wθ)
where w > 0 and E[w] = 1 works fine since then E[N ] = θ but D2[N ] = θ+ θ2D2[w]. In that case
we would also need to require E[N ]D2[w] ≥ B01−B0 . 
C1m =
1
2
∑∞
N=1BNT (N ≤ K)(
K−1
N )
(KN)
C1d =
1
2
∑∞
N=1BN
∑min{N,K}
p=1
(K−1p−1 )
( Kp−1)
1
K−p+1
(
a+ (1− a)T (N − p ≤ K)(
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
)
S1d =
1
2
∑∞
N=1BN
∑min{N,K}
p=1
(K−1p−1 )
( Kp−1)
1
K−p+1
(
1− a− (1− a)T (N − p ≤ K)(
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
)
C2m =
a
2
∑∞
N=1BNT (N −K ≤ K)
(K−1N−K)
( KN−K)
C2d =
a
2
∑∞
N=1BN
(
1− T (N −K ≤ K)(
K−1
N−K)
( KN−K)
)
S2d =
1−a
2
∑∞
N=1BN
∑min{N,K}
p=1
(K−1p−1 )
( Kp−1)
1
K−p+1
(
1− T (N − p ≤ K)(
K−1
N−p)
( KN−p)
)
Table 3: Captives and shoppers for a firm i with a discount price.
and an infinite number K −m discount prices; this is so because (
m
N)
(KN)
→ 0 and (
m
N−p)
( KN−p)
→ 0 as K →∞.
41
References
Ravi Anupindi, Maqbool Dada, and Sachin Gupta. Estimation of consumer demand with
stock-out based substitution: An application to vending machine products. Marketing
Science, 17(4):406–423, 1998.
Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff. In praise of honest pricing. MIT Sloan management review,
45(1):24–28, 2003.
Michael Baye, John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten. Information, search, and price disper-
sion. Handbook on economics and information systems, 1, 2006.
Erik Brynjolfsson and Michael Smith. Frictionless commerce? a comparison of internet
and conventional retailers. Management science, 46(4):563–585, 2000.
Kenneth Burdett and Kenneth Judd. Equilibrium price dispersion. Econometrica, pages
955–969, 1983.
Gerard Butters. Equilibrium distributions of sales and advertising prices. Review of
Economic Studies, 44:465–491, 1977.
Bruce Carlin. Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets. Journal of Financial
Economics, 91(3):278–287, 2009.
Bruce Carlin and Gustavo Manso. Obfuscation, learning, and the evolution of investor
sophistication. Review of Financial Studies, 24(3):754–785, 2011.
Bruce Ian Carlin and Florian Ederer. Search fatigue. Manuscript, 2014.
Ioana Chioveanu and Jidong Zhou. Price competition with consumer confusion. Manage-
ment Science, 59(11):2450–2469, 2013.
Peter Diamond. A model of price adjustment. Journal of economic theory, 3(2):156–168,
1971.
Xavier Dreze, Stephen Hoch, and Mary Purk. Shelf management and space elasticity.
Journal of Retailing, 70(4):301–326, 1995.
Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler. Consideration sets and competitive marketing. The Review
of Economic Studies, 78(1):235–262, 2011.
Glenn Ellison. A model of add-on pricing. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2):
585–637, 2005.
Glenn Ellison and Alexander Wolitzky. A search cost model of obfuscation. The RAND
Journal of Economics, 43(3):417–441, 2012.
Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson. Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and informa-
tion suppression in competitive markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages
505–540, 2006.
Tobias Gamp. Search, information acquisition, and obfuscation. Manuscript, 2015.
42
Andrei Hagiu and Bruno Jullien. Why do intermediaries divert search? The RAND
Journal of Economics, 42(2):337–362, 2011.
Saara Ha¨ma¨la¨inen. Halfway between diamond and bertrand. Manuscript, 2015.
Norman Ireland. Posting multiple prices to reduce the effectiveness of consumer price
search. Journal of Industrial Economics, LV (2):235–263, 2007.
Greg Kaplan and Guido Menzio. The morphology of price dispersion. International
Economic Review, 56(4):1165–1206, 2015.
Paul Klemperer. Markets with consumer switching costs. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, pages 375–394, 1987.
Paul Klemperer and Jorge Padilla. Do firms’ product lines include too many varieties?
The RAND Journal of Economics, pages 472–488, 1997.
Siddharth Mahajan and Garrett Van Ryzin. Inventory competition under dynamic con-
sumer choice. Operations Research, 49(5):646–657, 2001.
Preston McAfee. Multiproduct equilibrium price dispersion. Journal of Economic Theory,
67(1):83–105, 1995.
Guido Menzio and Nicholas Trachter. Equilibrium price dispersion across and within
stores. Manuscript, 2015.
John Morgan, Michael Baye, and Patrick Scholten. Price dispersion in the small and
in the large: Evidence from an internet price comparison site. Journal of Industrial
Economics, 52(4):463–496, 2004.
Eugene Orlov. How does the internet influence price dispersion? evidence from the airline
industry. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 59(1):21–37, 2011.
Vaiva Petrikaite. Consumer obfuscation by a multiproduct firm. Manuscript, 2015.
Michele Piccione and Ran Spiegler. Price competition under limited comparability. The
quarterly journal of economics, 127:97–135, 2012.
Fabio Pinna and Stephan Seiler. Consumer search: Evidence from path-tracking data.
Manuscript, 2015.
Elena Reutskaja, Rosemarie Nagel, Colin Camerer, and Antonio Rangel. Search dynamics
in consumer choice under time pressure: An eye-tracking study. The American Economic
Review, 101(2):900–926, 2011.
Andrew Rhodes. Multiproduct retailing. The Review of Economic Studies, 82:360–390,
2014.
Steven Salop. The noisy monopolist: imperfect information, price dispersion and price
discrimination. The Review of Economic Studies, pages 393–406, 1977.
Sandro Shelegia. Multiproduct pricing in oligopoly. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 30(2):231–242, 2012.
43
Ran Spiegler. Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations. Theoretical
Economics, 1(2):207–231, 2006.
Ran Spiegler. Competitive framing. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(3):
35–58, 2014.
Dale Stahl. Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search. The American Economic
Review, pages 700–712, 1989.
Greg Taylor. Browsing, salesmanship, and obfuscation. Manuscript, 2015.
Hal Varian. A model of sales. The American Economic Review, 70(4):651–659, 1980.
Tobias Wenzel. Hidden prices. Manuscript, 2014.
Chris Wilson. Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 28(5):496–506, 2010.
Asher Wolinsky. Brand names and price discrimination. The Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, pages 255–268, 1987.
44
